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To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It:
An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel
After Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shoret
fBy

R. CALLEN*
D. KADUE**

CRAIG

DAVID

Courts and commentators,1 prompted by the 1942 California
Supreme Court decision in Bernhardv. Bank of 4merica,2 continue to
debate whether mutuality should be required for the application of collateral estoppel. In common parlance, the issue is whether a person
who could not have been bound by the result of a prior adjudication
should be able to prevent a party who was unsuccessful on a particular
issue in that adjudication from relitigating the issue in a subsequent
adjudication. Because the party seeking to prevent relitigation would
t The authors wish to thank their colleagues at the University of Miami in 1978-9,
Bernard H. Oxman and Douglas M. Kramer, for their comments on previous drafts of this
Article.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.A., 197 1, University of
Iowa; J.D., 1974, Harvard University.
** B.A., 1975, Yale University; J.D., 1978, University of Minnesota. Member, Minnesota Bar.
1. See A. VESTAL, RES JUDiCATA/PREcLUSION (1969); Currie, Mutuaity of Collateral
cited as
Estoppel- Limits of the BernhardDoctrine,9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1956) [hereinafter
Curriel; Currie, CivilProcedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965); Greenebaum, In Defense ofthe Doctrine ofMutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Greenebaum]; Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35
Tm.L. L. REV. 301 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Currier]; Overton, The Restatement of
Judgments,CollateralEstoppel, andthe Conflict of Laws, 44 TENN. L. REv. 927 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Overton]; Polasky, CollateralEstoppel-Effects ofPriorLitigation,39 IOWA
L. Rav. 217, 243-50 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Polasky]; Semmel, CollateralEstoppel,Mutuality and JoinderofParties,68 COLuM. L. REV. 1457 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Semmel];
Vestal, Relitigation by Federal,4gencies Conflict, Concurrenceand Synthesis of JudicialPolicies, 55 N.C.L. REv. 123 (1977); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of
CollateralEstoppelbyaNonparty,35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
CollateralEstoppelby a Nonparty];Note, .4 ProbabilisticAnalysis ofthe Doctrineof futuality
of CollateralEstoppel, 76 Mxcn. L. REv. 612 (1978). For earlier views, see J. BENTHAM,
Rationale of JudicialEvidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (Bowring ed. 1843);
von Moschzisker, Res Judicata,38 YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1929).
2. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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not have been bound by an adverse result in the prior adjudication, the
prevention sought is nonmutual, 3 or unilateral.4 Because the previously unsuccessful party would be estopped from relitigating on the
basis of a collateral proceeding, courts call this prevention of relitiga5
tion collateral estoppel.
Bernhard made a gallant effort to establish the proposition that
mutuality is unnecessary:
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a
previous action should be precluded from asserting it as [collateral
estoppel] against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.
In determining the validity of a plea of [collateral estoppel] three
questions are pertinent. Was the issue decided in the prior action
identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was there
3. Courts once relied on a principle of mutuality, precluding a remedy for Party A
against Party B whenever Party B would not be entitled to the corresponding remedy
against Party A. E.g., Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328 (1897) (plaintiff not entitled to
specific performance when defendant breached contract under which plaintiff would provide
personal services and defendant would provide capital, because defendant would not be
entitled to specific performance had plaintiff breached). In the context of collateral estoppel,
mutuality would prevent a party from taking advantage of an earlier adjudication on the
ground that he or she would not have been bound by it had the result been the reverse. See
generally RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) (person neither party nor privy, see id

§§ 79-92, not entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication of any matter decided by a
judgment, other than a judgment in rem). Jurisdictions requiring mutuality permit various
exceptions to the principle. For example, a person not a party to an action, but having a
sufficiently close relationship with the successful party, may claim the benefits of any matter
decided in the successful party's action. Id § 83. For examples of such relationships, see id
§§ 94-111; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 79-87 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 99, 108-1 11 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Collateral

estoppel applied on behalf of such persons is still mutual in a broad sense, in that even
though they were not parties, they would have been bound had the result of the first action
been the reverse.
4. "Unilateral" is more precise than "nonmutual" and has support in case and comment. E.g., Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978 (Ct. Cl.
1967); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 281 F. Supp. 704, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Annot.,
31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1048 (1970). Unilateral use does not include use of collateral estoppel
against those who were not parties or otherwise represented in the litigation asserted as the
basis for estoppel. Cf. Semmel, supra note I, at 1459 (using "nonmutual" to encompass that
situation).
5. The terms "collateral estoppel" and "issue preclusion" both are used to describe
"the effect of the determination of an issue in another action ... on a different claim."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note at 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
"Issue preclusion" is becoming progressively more popular. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) with RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68, Comment a (1942). "Collateral estoppel," however, is the usage of the Supreme Court,
see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), and is probably the more common
usage among lawyers. This Article will use "collateral estoppel."
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a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea
a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudicais asserted
tion?6
Although the trend, 7 embodied in the second Restatement of Judgments,8 is toward adoption of the rationale in Bernhardand unilateral
use of collateral estoppel, some doubt remains as to whether the rationale is accepted in a majority of states.9 There is no question, however,
that a substantial minority clings to the mutuality requirement. Other
states which have abandoned mutuality in part, refuse to allow unilateral use of collateral estoppel offensively, le., by a party seeking to
establish an element of a claim for affirmative relief. 10
There are many superficially acceptable bases for opposing offensive, unilateral use of collateral estoppel. The primary arguments are:
(1) that the ascertainment of truth is an important goal of the litigation
process and unilateral collateral estoppel may bind parties to prior adjudications which did not establish the truth;' H (2) that the result of any
given litigation is likely to be influenced by such extra-legal factors as
the attractiveness of the parties, the ability of counsel, or the personal
prejudices of the jurors, rendering such result a poor basis for future
decisions;' 2 (3) that the party who was defeated in the prior action may
have lost only because of tactical disadvantages of the forum, which the
defeated party did not choose;' 3 (4) that allowing unilateral assertions
of collateral estoppel, especially offensively, may undermine judicial
economy, an important goal of collateral estoppel, by permitting persons who might have joined an earlier action to wait and bring separate
actions, asserting an estoppel based on the first;14 (5) that it is unfair for
6. 19 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 122 P.2d at 895.
7. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 323-36 (1971).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
9. See Note, CollateralEstofpel." The ChangingRole ofthe Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo.
L. REv. 521, 522 n.7 (1976) (asserting mutuality is the majority rule). The second Restatement states that the Bernhard doctrine has achieved general acceptance, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Reporter's Note at 170-71 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976), but this may
be an overstatement. See Overton, supra note 1, at 935-37.
10. E.g., Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968); Nevarov v.

Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958). See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

Reporter's Note at 171 & cases cited (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
11. E.g., Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281,286, 445 P.2d 557, 560 (1968); Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 487, 449 P.2d 536, 541 (1969). But see notes 69-75 & accompanying text infra.
12. For a discussion of this argument, see notes 76-86 & accompanying text infra.
13. Currie, supra note 1, at 303-07, 321-22. For further discussion, see notes 107-119 &
accompanying text infra.
14. See, e.g., Newport Div., Tenneco Chem., Inc. v. Thompson, 330 So. 2d 826, 828
JUDGMENTS,
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one who has not risked anything in the prior action to use a favorable
result against one who was a party to that action;' 5 and finally (6) that
unilateral collateral estoppel, if applied mechanically, would require
estopping a party who had lost in a prior action, even though other
actions in which that party was involved were inconsistent with that
6
adverse result.'
The courts should use collateral estoppel unilaterally and offensively despite the criticisms just listed. Indeed, this Article argues that
the first five of these criticisms deserve little credence and that the
problems which prior inconsistent judgments pose have been grossly
exaggerated.
In ParklaneHosiery Co. . Shore,17 the Supreme Court allowed
offensive unilateral use of collateral estoppel, thus indicating that the
Court did not consider the criticisms of the doctrine sufficiently serious
to bar offensive use completely. In addition, the Court set out some
general standards for offensive use. As a result of the generality of the
Parklane standards and the possible impact Parklane may have on
states' 8 which have not yet abandoned mutuality, as well as those
which have not yet allowed offensive use, this Article proposes an interpretation of the standards based on a discussion of the theory of collateral estoppel. After a discussion of the Parklane case, 19 the Article
analyzes collateral estoppel, addressing the objections to both defensive
and offensive unilateral use. 20 The Article then assesses a recent Oregon case in terms of the analysis submitted 2' and, finally, suggests an
application of the analysis to an area of substantive law with unique
(Fla. Ct. App. 1976); Bahier v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 18, 474 P.2d 329, 337-38 (1970); Semmel,

supra note I, at 1457-75, 1479; CollateralEstoppelby a Nonparty, supra note 1, at 1024-36,
1038, 1045-46. For further discussion, see notes 123-46 & accompanying text infra.
15.

See, e.g., Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 487, 449 P.2d 536, 541 (1969); Greene-

baum, supra note 1; Moore & Currier, supra note 1. For further discussion, see notes 87-93
& accompanying text infra.
16. E.g., Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 49-50, 191 N.W.2d
313, 319 (1971). See notes 94-99 & accompanying text infra.
17.

439 U.S. 322 (1979).

18.

The Supreme Court's decision, which settled a point of federal law, see generally

Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusionby Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MiCH.

L. Rav. 1723 (1968), has no formal effect on the law of any state. Nevertheless, federal court
practice traditionally has heavily influenced state court practice. Compare McHone v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 406 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (diversity case implying that
mutuality was not required for collateral estoppel in Ohio) with Hicks v. De La Cruz, 52
Ohio St. 2d 71, 369 N.E.2d 776 (1977) (relying on McHone to hold that Ohio law does not

require mutuality).
19.

See notes 23-50 & accompanying text infra.

20.
21.

See notes 51-146 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 147-75 & accompanying text infra.
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22
procedural and policy problems: patent law.

An Outline of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
In Parklane,plaintiffs brought a stockholder's class action against
Parklane Hosiery Company and twelve of its officers, directors and
stockholders, alleging that the defendants had issued a materially false
and misleading proxy statement 23 in connection with a merger. 24
Before the class action came to trial, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed suit in federal district court against the
same defendants alleging that the proxy statement issued by Parklane
was materially false and misleading, on essentially the same basis asserted in the class action.25 After a four-day trial, a declaratory judgment was entered that the proxy statement was materially false and
misleading in the respects alleged.2 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 27
Plaintiffs in the class action then moved for partial summary judgment 28 against the defendants, asserting that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved against them in
the SEC action.29 The district court held that the defendants could not
be collaterally estopped by virtue of the prior judgment, apparently because such an estoppel would deny the defendants' right to a jury trial
under the seventh amendment. 30 On appeal, the Second Circuit court
22. See notes 178-274 & accompanying text infra.
23. Although the issue in Parklanewas one of fact, in the subsequent case of Montana
v. United States, 440 U.S. 149 (1979), the Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel could
be applied to resolve questions of law. Montanaholds that collateral estoppel is available on
questions of federal law at least where (I) successive actions do not involve unrelated subject
matters; (2) no party raising constitutional issues was forced to accept state court adjudication of those issues; and (3) there are no allegations of unfairness or inadequacy in the
procedures of the prior court. Id at 162-63.
24. 439 U.S. at 324. Plaintiffs alleged th.at the proxy statement violated §§ 14(a), 10(b),
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and various rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 439 U.S. at 324. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n(a), 78j(b), 78t(a), 78a-78hh (1976).
25. 439 U.S. at 324. Compare SEC v. Parkiane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) with Shore v. Parkiane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
26. 422 F. Supp. at 487.
27. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
28. If Parklane were bound by the prior judgment, the plaintiff class still would be
required to prove its damages. 439 U.S. at 325 n.2 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 386-90 (1969)). Thus, the summary judgment could be partial only.
29. Id. at 325.
30. The entire text of the district judge's opinion appears to be: "The within motion is
denied. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). So ordered." See Shore v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977).
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seemed to encounter no problem with offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel. 31 In reversing the judgment, the court held that once the
issues had been determined in the SEC action, no question of fact re32
mained on which to base a right to a jury trial.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 33 While it approved the
offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court's approach differed substantially from that of the court of appeals. In reasoning that offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel in the
Parklane case would not deprive the defendants of their right to a trial
by jury,34 the Court, per Justice Stewart, devoted a substantial portion
of its opinion to considering whether, "quite apart from the right to a
jury trial. . . a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may
nevertheless use that judgment 'offensively' to prevent a defendant
from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding." 35
The Parklane Court recognized the disparity in the binding effect
36
of prior actions that results from unilateral use of collateral estoppel:
through application of unilateral estoppel, an unsuccessful party to a
prior action would be estopped in a subsequent action. Due process
requirements dictate, however, that had that same party been successful, he or she could not have asserted collateral estoppel against one
who was not a party to the prior action or who did not otherwise have
an opportunity to be heard. 37 The Court held that unilateral collateral
estoppel should be applied offensively despite this disparity in binding
effect when the trial court, within its broad discretion, determines that
38
it is appropriate.
In providing a guide to exercising that discretion, the Supreme
Court concluded that a trial judge should not allow such unilateral use
of offensive collateral estoppel in two situations: where the plaintiff
31. 565 F.2d at 818-19. The court relied chiefly on Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of 111. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). For a discussion of Blonder-Tongue,
see notes 195-203 & accompanying text infra.
32. 565 F.2d at 819, 824.
33. 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). Certiorari was granted because of a conflict on the seventh
amendment issue between the Second Circuit decision in Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565
F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), and the Fifth Circuit decision in Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th
Cir. 1970). Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 325 n.3 (1979).
34. 439 U.S. at 335-37.
35. Id at 326.
36. See id at 330.
37. See id at 331 n. 15 (noting potential procedural unfairness which could follow from
application of collateral estoppel).
38. 439 U.S. at 331 n.16 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Reporter's
Note at 99 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) (noting general acceptance among state courts of a "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" standard)).
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39
asserting the doctrine "could easily have joined in the earlier action"
and where application of the doctrine "would be unfair to a defendant." 4 The Court enumerated four situations which may indicate un-

fairness in. the application of estoppel.41 First, the Court noted that

"[i]f a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if
future suits are not foreseeable." 4 2 Second, the Court was concerned

about cases in which "the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor
of the defendant." 43 Third, "where the second action affords the de-

fendant procedural oppportunities unavailable in the first action that
could readily cause a different result collateral estoppel may be inappropriate." 44 Finally, where "other reasons" exist which might give
rise to unfairness, 45 the doctrine may be held inapplicable.
The Court detected none of these indications of unfairness in the
Parklane case. 46 Consequently, these standards technically are dicta.
Given past experience, however, the Supreme Court doubtlessly intends these guidelines to be taken seriously.47 In all likelihood, these
39. 439 U.S. at 331. See notes 145-46 & accompanying text infra.
40. 439 U.S. at 331.
41. Note the use of "may" or "might" in the description of these three factors, id, as
opposed to the use of "would" and "should" in the section of the Parklaneopinion that
discusses the trial court's discretion. Id That these factors should only be relevant to the
collateral estoppel inquiry, rather than requiring the trial court to deny collateral estoppel
effect, seems reasonable. For example, the trial court should not be required to deny collateral estoppel effect simply because the amount at stake in the initial action was small, for the
defendant might have chosen to contest it vigorously (1) as part of a policy of contesting all
claims vigorously, (2) to avoid establishment of an unfavorable rule of law, (3) for reasons of
public relations, (4) for reasons of honor, (5) to avoid adverse consequences which might
grow out of an unfavorable judgment, such as loss of professional license or investigation by
law enforcement bodies, or even (6) to discourage other foreseeable possible plaintiffs from
bringing a similar action.
42. Id at 330 (citing Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 323
U.S. 720 (1944) and Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965)).
43. 439 U.S. at 330 (footnote omitted). See general Currie, supra note 1; RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(4) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). See notes 89-94 & accompanying text infra.
44. 439 U.S. at 331 & n.15. One example would be where the defendant was forced to
litigate in an inconvenient forum, which is especially a problem where a defendant in the
second action was also the defendant in the first action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2), Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) contains a similar provision. For
further discussion, see notes 108-12 & accompanying text infra.
45. 439 U.S. at 331. See notes 112-16 & accompanying text infra.
46. 439 U.S. at 331.
47. CompareGeduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) with Gilbert v. General Elec. Co.,
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Aiello, a state's disability plan
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standards will govern the application of offensive unilateral collateral
estoppel in the federal courts. 48 Substantial doubt nonetheless remains
in some state courts about the desirability of the offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel.49 The standards in Parklane can and should
prompt offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel in additional
states and spur abandonment of mutuality in those states in which it is
still required. °

An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel
5
The Usefulness of Collateral Estoppel in the Legal System '

Courts and commentators, almost without exception, have cited

two policies as the basis for collateral estoppel: protection of individual
litigants from harassment or burdensome relitigation caused by a party

against whom they have already litigated an issue,52 and judicial economy. 53 Defenders of mutuality argue that these policies are insufficient
which failed to provide benefits to pregnant women was challenged under the equal protection clause. The Aello Court stated in footnote 20 that pregnancy was not a sex-based
classification. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Gilbert stated that footnote 20 was limited to equal protection questions and did not apply to Title VII claims. 519
F.2d at 666. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on Aiello's
footnote, as establishing that pregnancy is not a sex-based classification under Title VII.
48. Eight years prior to Parklane,in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the Supreme Court gave its blessing to defensive use
of unilateral collateral estoppel, at least insofar as patent infringement suits are concerned.
The Court specifically declined to consider offensive use. 1d at 330. Parklane was the
Court's first pronouncement on the special considerations pertinent to offensive use. For
further discussion of Blonder-Tongue, see notes 195-203 & accompanying text infra.
49. See cases cited note 10 supra.
50. See cases cited note 9 supra.
51. See generally Currie, Res Judicata." The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317
(1978).
52. E.g., Edgar v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 243, 245 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Bernhard v. Bank
of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942); Semmel, supra note 1; Vestal,
Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 31, 34 (1946).
53. E.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964); Overton, supra note
1. Although judicial economy and prevention of harassment are the policies cited most
often as underlying collateral estoppel, others have been mentioned as well. One is maintaining public confidence in the courts. E.g., Vestal, Relitigationby FederalAgencies: Conflict, Concurrenceand Synthesis ofJudicialPolicies, 55 N.C.L. REV. 123, 175 (1977); Vestal,
Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 31, 33-34 (1946). The degree to which collateral estoppel furthers this policy, however, is slight at best. See Hazard, Res Nova in Res
Judicata,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1971). Another reason offered for collateral estoppel is the desire to afford equal treatment to all litigants. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal
Agencies: Conflict, Concurrenceand Synthesis of JudicialPolicies, 55 N.C.L. REV. 123, 146
(1977). Like public confidence in the courts, however, equality ofjudicial treatment is less a
justification for collateral estoppel than its usual effect. Moreover, "equality of treatment" is
such a vague concept that it not only may be said to justify a broad application of collateral

March 1980]

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

to justify either the abrogation of mutuality or the offensive, unilateral
use of collateral estoppel.54 This argument, however, ignores, as both
critics and proponents of the Bernharddoctrine often do, the most important justification of collateral estoppel: like stare decisis, collateral
estoppel serves a valuable function in the ordering of extra-judicial re5
lationships. 5
The collateral estoppel effect of any one case will not be as broad
as its stare decisis effect, i e., collateral estoppel based on case A is not a
possible rule of decision in as many actions as the stare decisis effect of
case A would be. The impact of collateral estoppel should not be underestimated, however; if collateral estoppel is applied the party to the
prior action is absolutely prohibited from relitigating the identical issue
arising in a subsequent adjudication. This finality allows the parties to
plan their conduct outside the judicial forum, 56 whether by allowing
them to use resources for purposes other than judicial battle,5 7 by encouraging them to behave in ways approved by the prior decision, 58 by
estoppel but also may be said to justify restricting it by, for example, imposing a mutuality
requirement.
Professor Hazard has suggested another reason for collateral estoppel: the avoidance,
as far as possible, of imposing conflicting legal obligations on a single individual. Hazard,
supra, at 1042 & n.15. Accord, Armstrong v. United States, 354 F.2d 274, 290-91 (Ct. Cl.
1965). This objective is the reason for compulsory joinder rules, see Hazard, supra, at 1042
& n.16, and for the rules binding successors in interest and represented parties under collateral estoppel, see note 3 supra. But it does not explain applications of collateral estoppel
where the inconsistency avoided is that of a party's rights, as opposed to his or her obligations. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971) (discussed at notes 195-203 & accompanying text infra). The avoidance of
inconsistent obligations, then, is at best a limited explanation, applying only to some applications of collateral estoppel.
54. E.g., Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 487, 449 P.2d 536, 541 (1969); Moore & Currier, su~pra note 1, at 308.
55. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of III. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971); Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (res judicata, including collateral estoppel, rests on "public
policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations"); Hazard, Res Nova in Res
Judicata,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1041, 1042 (1971) (need to manage and reduce doubt as
to judicial outcome one reason for collateral estoppel); Note, CollateralEstoppek The DeriseofMutuality, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 724, 724 (1967) (collateral estoppel's third goal, after
saving judicial time and avoiding litigious harassment, is facilitating reliance on final judgments). See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979).
56. Cf. A. VESTAL, REs JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-8 to V-9 (1969) (idea that
"fr]elatioaships must be fixed and not subject to change for indefinite periods" is one premise underlying judicial system).
57. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971).
58. For example, a holding of patent invalidity informs manufacturers who might
otherwise be liable for patent infringement that they are reasonably safe in investing or in
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discouraging them from behaving in a manner they know to be illegal, 59 or by preventing the estopped party from using the threat of relitigation to extract concessions from a person who was not a party to the
60
prior action.
Fundamental Irrelevance: The Arguments of Bernhard's Critics
The critics of Bernhard premise their criticism on the belief that
mutuality is necessary for the appropriate application of collateral estoppel. Their real objection, however, appears to be that the action on
which collateral estoppel is sought to be based was deficient, either because of deficiencies inherent in our system of civil procedure or because of deficiencies peculiar to that particular action. The remedy for
these deficiencies is not to invoke a requirement of mutuality; the remedy is either to correct the institutional deficiencies directly or to refuse
to apply collateral estoppel in those cases in which specific deficiencies
61
in the prior action can be discerned.
This section first addresses the general objections to unilateral use,
which seem to be based on a dissatisfaction with the way our system of
civil procedure works: the objection based on a perception that the
system should strive for absolute correctness of decision 62 and the objection based on the possibility of inconsistent judgments. 63 The section then proposes a method by which allegedly inconsistent judgments
can be evaluated. 64 Next, the discussion turns to objections that relate
more directly to offensive use. Specifically, these objections include
both the unfairness offensive use would create if the common defendant lost the first action because of the tactical disadvantages of a forum
he or she did not select, 65 and the unfairness and judicial diseconomy
offensive use is said to create by promoting litigation generally and by
continuing to invest in production of items covered by the patent. Cf Lieberman & Nelson,
In Rem Validit---A Two Sided Coin, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 9, 19 n.50 (1971) (quoting statement of Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner: "The uncertainty which [inconsistent results create] for business is a serious obstacle to enterprise and innovation").
59. As where a patentee, knowing he or she will be estopped from relitigating a patent
because it has been adjudged invalid after a full and fair opportunity to litigate, refrains
from further attempts to enforce the patent.
60. As where an alleged infringer, relying on the availability of collateral estoppel,
points out to a patentee, in a meeting discussing the alleged infringement, that the patent is
invalid based on a prior adjudication of invalidity, thus precluding the patentee's threats of
relitigation.
61. See Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 10-20, 474 P.2d 329, 334-39 (1970).
62. See notes 69-75 & accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 76-94 & accompanying text infra.
64. See notes 95-97 & accompanying text infra.
65. See notes 100-19 & accompanying text infra.
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on the part of those who would
promoting a "wait-and-see" attitude
66

otherwise join a suit as plaintiffs.

A General Analysis of Unilateral Collateral Estoppel
The Choice Between Rationality andRepetition

Proponents of the mutuality requirement have argued that relitigation is justified because the litigation process is fallible. 67 This argument must rest on one of two propositions: either the judicial system
requires certainty of the correctness of the result of prior litigation
before allowing estoppel based on that result or, even though our procedural system does not provide for such certainty, some issues should
be relitigated because the results of a prior litigation may vary widely
due to the unreliability of factfrnders. These arguments will be ex-

amined first with respect to the goal of certainty in the trial process and
then with respect to the alleged unreliability of factfinders.
Before embarking on this examination, however, one should note

that if the result of a prior action is unacceptable as a basis for use of
collateral estoppel owing to these flaws, then the process by which the
first action was decided is itself seriously in need of reform. Thus, even

if the arguments based on supposed defects in any prior litigation are
accepted, they logically would require complete abolition of collateral
estoppel rather than a mere requirement of mutuality. 68 This again
demonstrates how the critics of Bernhardseek a remedy unsuited to the
dangers they perceive.
66. See notes 120-46 & accompanying text infra.
67. E.g., Greenebaum, supra note 1, at 2. Indeed, all arguments for mutuality must
assume some sort of undetectable fallibility in any particular case; otherwise there would be
no reason to repeat cases in which flaws had not been detected.
68. "Granting that the outcome of litigation is fallible and that there is a difference in
opponents, is such fallibility really relevant to a determination of whether an issue once
decided should be litigated? There may be numerous reasons why it is easier for B to defeat
Xthan for him to defeat 4. Xmay be a very unappealing fellow with a poor lawyer, and he
may be obviously rich besides. However, this does not mean that, on the average, a decision
in favor of B against Xis more likely to be correct than the previous decision against B and
in favor of 4. If the unpredictability of the outcome of litigation is good cause for relitigation, there is no reason why identical parties should not be permitted to relitigate the same
issue. To us, the fallibility of litigation ... seems a poor reason for relitigating an issue."
Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 9, 474 P.2d 329, 333-34 (1970). Accord, Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973). Blumcraft pointed out that the
Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1979), had ruled that a plaintiff could be collaterally estopped on the basis of one
prior litigation, even though that decision may have been incorrect. For further discussion
of Blonder-Tangue,see notes 195-203 & accompanying text ifra.
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Contrary to the arguments of mutuality's supporters, 69 our system
of civil procedure is not designed to produce absolute certainty of the

truth in any given litigation or in a series of litigations. The usual burden of proof standard in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence test.70 This test establishes the point at which a rational
decisionmaker would rule in the proponent's favor,7 1 assuming that an

72
error in making one choice would be no more harmful than another.

The factfinder is not required to suspend decision until the absolute

truth is certain. 73 Because a jury is not required to find absolute
69. One supporter of mutuality has argued that the power of the trial courts and appellate courts to correct errors at the trial level, and the right of trial courts to reopen judgments
or exercise equitable relief in the case of fraud or newly discovered evidence, indicate a
pervasive policy of seeking certainty in the judicial system. Overton, supra note I, at 930-3 1.
See also Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 977-78 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (justifying patent relitigation on basis of likelihood of error in first suit). This contention is simply overstated. If a party who lost the first litigation had all these tools available
to correct error and was unsuccessful or did not even bother to use them, it is only logical to
say that the result of the first litigation should be applied in later litigation. See generally
note 75 infra.
70. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (2d ed. 1977).
71. The test assumes a minimum amount of evidence, i e., more than a scintilla, has
been introduced. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EvIDENCE, BY EDMUND M. MORGAN 16 (5th ed. 1976).
72. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FacFndingProcess, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1072
(1968).
73. Some courts have mentioned certainty as a requirement of the preponderance test.
It would appear, however, that these courts were searching for verbiage to explain to jurors
that they were not to find in accordance with what might be more likely in a broad range of
cases, but rather with what was more likely in the particular case they were trying. See
Lampe v. Franklin Am. Trust Co., 339 Mo. 361, 96 S.W.2d 710 (1936); Logeman Bros. Co.
v. R.J. Pruess Co., 131 Wis. 122, 111 N.W. 64 (1907); 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2498, at
325 (3d ed. 1940). The courts' problem is avoided when the preponderance criterion is
viewed subjectively, ie., that A is more probable than not when a person offered a reward
for choosing correctly would choose A rather than not A. See Tribe, Trialby Mathematics,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1347 (1971) (citing L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS
(1950)). See also Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FacndingProcess, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1066-67 (1968).
Professors James, Hazard, and McCormick already have pointed out that this is the
way jurors should, and in fact do, interpret instructions that the proponent must prove his or
her contentions by a preponderance of the evidence. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (2d ed. 1977). See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 339 (1972). See also Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975
BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L. REV. 601, 614-15.
As Judge Weinstein has explained: "Lawyers are aware that almost never can we be
certain, after the event, of what happened. The courts more and more are treating the jury
with the respect they expect for themselves. Under such circumstances, the only sound approach is to charge the jury in the average civil case that it must find it more probable than
not that the proposition of fact, which must be established by the party with the burden of
proof, is true." See J. WEINSTEIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE, BY
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truth, 74 and because repeated trials will not necessarily remedy the failings of prior trials, the question is, once the courts have done the best
they can, why should they repeat the process 75 when no subsequent

litigation either will or is intendedto determine the absolute truth?
Even if the critics of unilateral collateral estoppel were to concede
that the purpose of the preponderance test is not to ascertain the truth

but to enable the making of a decision, related arguments persist based
on the notion that different juries would assess the same evidence differently. For this reason, the critics argue that relitigation is proper, if
the losing party so desires, to ensure that the losing party will not be
unduly prejudiced by sympathy for an attractive opponent or by some
other factor which cannot or should not be replicated in subsequent
litigation. 76 While one might suppose that different jurors initially may
M. MORGAN 17 (5th ed. 1976). Cf. Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp., 209 F.2d 929 (2d
Cir. 1954) (discussing dangers of literal reading of the term "preponderance").
74. "Courts can only do their best to determine the truth on the basis of the evidence,
and the first lesson one must learn on the subject of resjudicata is that judicial findings must
not be confused with absolute truth." Currie, supra note I, at 315. In fact, many aspects of
our adjudicatory system subordinate this goal to other policies. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL 85-86, 93, 94, 97 (1949) (citing practices which impede rather than facilitate the discovery of truth). Other examples of rules which exist to prevent disclosure of the truth are
evidentiary privileges such as the priest-penitent, attorey-client, interspousal, and physician-patient privileges.
75. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 331-32 (1971) (expressing doubt that in a difficult case, second could decide issues more
accurately than first); National Resources Defense Fund Council, Inc. v EPA, 465 F.2d 492,
495 (1st Cir. 1972) (transfer of action where issues raised "seem to be identical with those
raised in every other circuit"). See also B. CARDOZO, The Nature ofthe JudicialProcess,in
SELECTED WITrNGS 170-71 (M. Hall ed. 1947). Indeed, collateral estoppel is not hobbled
by rules providing for correction of errors in a trial-such as the availability of appeal or the
availability of a motion for the reopening or setting aside of the judgment-since these rules
will prevent collateral estoppel effect based on the prior action only if the invocation of these
rules has resulted in the vacation of the judgment. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41,
Comment d (1942). If correctness of result were the primary factor to consider, then the first
litigation, if ever achieving collateral estoppel effect, would not do so until the losing party
had accepted the result of the prior action or exhausted all avenues of reconsideration and
appeal. If judicial economy also is considered, then subsequent litigation would be stayed
pending the result of the losing party's attempts, if any, to have the judgment corrected. In
fact, neither solution has been adopted, for there is a third factor to consider: the interest in
speedily determining the rights of parties so that reliance and private planning may occur.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment g (rent. Draft No. 1,
1973). Because of this third factor, collateral estoppel may be applied immediately on the
basis of a prior judgment, even though that prior judgment eventually may be reversed. In
that event, the judgment applying collateral estoppel may be re-opened. Id § 41.3.
76. See, e.g. Overton, supranote I, at 933-34; Note,.4 ProbabilisticAnalysis ofthe Doctrineofgutualityof CollateralEstopel,76 MICH. L. REv. 612, 626 (1978). Overton expands
this argument to include possible defects in the prior litigation-attractiveness of the common party's first opponent, a lack of skill of the common party's advocate in the prior.case,
EDMUND
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view the same evidence differently, 77 this possibility is reduced by the

requirement of unanimity or concurrence of a substantial majority of
the jurors in any given verdict. The greater the requirement for con-

currence, which is achieved in large part by jurors consulting with each
other, the lesser the likelihood that the jury's verdict will be swayed by
78
extra-legal factors.

In addition, this argument for relitigation as an antidote to jury
fallibility ignores the practical impact of a prior action on subsequent
actions. Even if the judgment in the prior case is not binding in subsequent litigation between different parties, the conduct of the first litigation will influence subsequent litigation. 79 For example, assume
plaintiff 2 sues D, alleging negligence in a transaction that was the subject of a prior litigation in which plaintiff I prevailed over D. Even
without application of collateral estoppel, the probability that plaintiff

2, relying on plaintiff l's experience in the prior action, also will prevail
over D on the issue of negligence must be greater than was the
probability that plaintiff I would prevail in the prior suit. 80
More particularly, as to issues of fact, plaintiff 2 will be able to
and other factors unrelated to the merits-as reasons why the prior judgment should not be
the basis for collateral estoppel. This argument proves too much. It is actually an argument
for abolishing collateral estoppel entirely. See text accompanying note 61 supra. In any
event, Parklaneand the second Restatement provide exceptions to deal with cases involving
the unfairness Overton contemplates. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 329-30;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88(8), Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
This flexible test, which avoids the disadvantages of a wooden rule denying or allowing
collateral estoppel, has been used for some time. See e.g., Bruszewski v. United States, 181
F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950). For specific instances of possible unfairness that may make
collateral estoppel inapplicable, see notes 77, 108-19 & accompanying text infra.
77. The argument here is not that judgments based on compromise verdicts should be
the basis for collateral estoppel-a possibility which has concerned some commentators.
E.g., Currie,supra note 1, at 288-99 n.37; Semmel, supra note 1, at 1468. Seeaso Leipert v.
Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 247 P.2d 324 (1952); Currie, supra note 1, at 296-300.
78. Foss, A Critique of Jury Simulation Research 3, 4 (1975) (annual meeting of American Psychological Ass'n); Foss, Group Decision Processes in the Simulated Trial Jury 16-18
(1975) (annual meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Ass'n). Cf. Forston, Sense and
Non-Sense." Jury TrialCommunication, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L. REV. 601,614 (discussing juror adherence to jury instructions).
79. Courts have recognized the strategic advantage of winning the first of a series of
multiple litigation. "[W]e wonder how often it is that a person, when faced with multiple
litigation arising out of a single factual situation, does not intentionally put his best foot
forward, regardless of the nature of the first case." Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 11, 474 P.2d
329, 334 (1970). "It was obvious that plaintiff's counsel who represented the heirs of other
deceased passengers was litigating his most favorable case in an attempt to test the liability
and monetary responsibility of both [defendants]." In re Air Crash Disaster, Dayton, Ohio,
350 F. Supp. 757, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Humphreys v.
Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
80. Cf. Evans & Robbins, The Demise ofMutuality in CollateralEstoppel (The Second
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exploit plaintiff l's successes in the prior action and will be able to correct any of plaintiff l's errors in that action. D, on the other hand, will
not be so free to correct any errors. For example, D's witnesses will be
subject to impeachment based on their statements at the prior trial.81
Should D decide to submit new evidence or rely on new legal theories,
plaintiff 2 will have no greater problems in preparation than did the
prior plaintiff.82 As to issues of law, since the facts generating the issues
remain the same, D's chances of distinguishing the precedent created in
the prior action are slim indeed.
The most seriously flawed argument raised by critics of the unilateral use of collateral estoppel is that based on the supposed need to
avoid the influence of extra-judicial factors on factfinding by relitigation. Assuming that the influence of extra-judicial factors on factfinding is as serious as critics argue, the judicial system is incapable of
controlling the influence of these factors by examining the results of a
particular trial or series of trials.83 Nor can a representative series of
lawsuits be relied on to reflect the variations in these factors between
trials as a means of finding the "true" decision. 84 That any court would
find the standards for such sampling worth the time and trouble to develop is highly doubtful. Further, no court is likely to believe itself
competent to develop such standards.
Relitigation absent an ability to identify and remove these extraRoundPatentSuit-The Not-So-InstantReplay), 24 OKLA. L. REv. 179, 179 (1971) (second
patent infringement suit "very often tends to be a replay of the first").
81. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 613. In federal court prior inconsistent statements of the sort
hypothesized are admissible to prove the matter asserted therein. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A).
82. Given the frequent availability of discovery of evidence that will be offered and
legal theories that will be advanced, plaintiff 2, in effect, will know the contentions to be
faced at trial before the trial begins. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
83. See Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FacfndingProcess, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065,
1065 (1968) (proposing application of the basic tools of decision theory to the factfinding
process).
84. No one knows the frequency of the incidence of extra-legal factors. Consequently,
were a court to attempt to control the influence of these factors, it would appear that first the
court must permit repetitive suits litigating an identical issue. The decisions on this issuewhich, to be sufficiently rigorous, would have to be a representative sample-would be affected by various extra-legal factors. From these decisions the courts could choose the
"best" (Ze., most free from extra-legal influence) and modify all others to conform with this
"best" result.
"Correcting" previous judgments, of course, largely will destroy any reliance that may
otherwise be placed on judgments that precede the courts' selection of the "best" result,
assuming courts are capable of such a selection. But such retrospective correction is the
logical consequence of a concern that the ultimate result be that which would occur under
ideal, laboratory conditions.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

judicial influences would result in the arbitrary visitation of those influences the critics complain of into a series of trials. Moreover, such re-

litigation abandons any concept of the advantages of judicial economy,
the prevention of harassment, and the settlement of extra-judicial relations which are the bases for the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 85 In
short, the proposed solution---continuance of mutuality--does little or

nothing to remedy the problem for which it is advanced while depriving litigants of the positive influences of unilateral collateral estoppel.
To the extent mutuality is retained because of an asserted pervasiveness

proof irrational factors, it merely increases the irrationality which the
86

ponents of mutuality argue is inherent in the litigation process.
The Sfren Song of Symmetry

The second main objection to the assertion of unilateral collateral

87
estoppel is based on a notion that symmetry is identical to fairness.

Even jurisdictions abandoning mutuality have treated this second ma-

jor argument for mutuality with more respect than it should command. 88
An extreme illustration of the problem follows: 0 is the absentee
owner of a large parcel of land. A developer without authorization
subdivides the land and sells homes thereon to fifty individuals. 0
85. See notes 69-75 & accompanying text supra.
86. To the extent that criticism of Bernhard is based on the notion that succeeding
multiple parties should endure the supposed irrationalities of the trial system, rather than on
an argument that the subsequent multiple parties should not get a free ride, the analysis set
out in the text applies.
87. "Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a stranger, the
contrary judgment shall not be evidence for him. If the rule itself is a curious one, the
reason for it is still more so.-'Nobody can take benefit by a verdict, who had not been
prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary--'a maxim which one would suppose to have found its
way from the gaming table to the bench." J. BENTHAM, Rationale of JudicialEvidence, in 7
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (Bowring ed. 1843). Contra, Currie, supra note 1, at 288
n. 17. Moore & Currier make a variation of the critics' argument: they argue that the theory
of an in personam action is that only the parties thereto will be bound. This argument can
be construed two ways.
Moore and Currier either are arguing this theory based on assumed definition of personal jurisdiction or have somehow discovered the essence of the in personam action. As to
the personal jurisdiction possibility, given that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04,
(1977), makes the standards for personal jurisdiction "reasonableness," "fair play," and
"substantial justice," Moore and Currier are basically arguing that unilateral collateral estoppel is unfair, not that it offends an absolute standard. Their argument that unilateral
collateral estoppel offends the theory of the in personam action, given their lack of support
for any such theory, or its application to the question of mutuality, similarly assumes its
conclusion. See Moore & Currier, supra note 1.
88. E.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97,
550 P.2d 1185 (1976).
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eventually sues the putative owners for trespass and wins the first
twenty-five actions. He loses the twenty-sixth.89 Is it fair to rule, in the
twenty-seventh action, that 0 is bound by the unfavorable result of the
twenty-sixth? 90
89. This is a variation of the well known railroad train hypothetical propounded by
Professor Currie. See Currie, supra note 1, at 281-82. Currie posited a defendant railroad
opposing fifty passengers suing separately for injuries caused by the same train wreck. The
first twenty-five passengers lost, the twenty-sixth won. The example in text, using multiple
defendants, not plaintiffs, was created to avoid tying the problems of inconsistent results in
multiple claims with the problems of offensive use. Note that Currie later abandoned his
reservations about the "multiple claimant anomaly," at least where the common party had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior case and where the basic question was
one of law. Currie, CivilProcedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 28-33, 36
(1965). Contra, Reardon v. Allen, 88 NJ. Super. 560, 567-73, 213 A.2d 26, 30-32 (1965).
Practically speaking, the inconsistent judgment problem propounded by Currie is unlikely to occur. Indeed, only three cases have squarely considered the influence of prior
inconsistent judgments on the question of whether collateral estoppel is appropriate. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976); State ex rel. Dep't of
Transp. v. Jewett, 28 Or. App. 531, 559 P.2d 1312 (1977). See notes 147-237 & accompanying text infira. As Professor Vestal has pointed out: "It is feared that in a spurious class
action suit the other members of the class would wait for the first winning plaintiff and then
claim preclusion. Although this is a possibility, the usual result would be that if the defendant wins in the first, he will win the subsequent suits or that such cases will not be tried."
Vestal, Preclusion/ResxudicataVariables: Parties,50 IowA L. REV. 27, 56 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vestal].
One problem with the hypothetical in text is that, in attempting to set out problems of
multiple parties apart from problems of offensive use, it gives 0 the incentive in the first
action. Several commentators have said that unilateral collateral estoppel may not be appropriate when the party against whom the estoppel is asserted did not have the initiative in
the prior action. See, e.g., Currie, supranote I, at 303-07, 321-22; Overton, supra note 1, at
938-43; CollateralEstoppel by a onparty, supra note 1, at 1055. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(7) & Reporter's Memorandum at xiii (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975)
(catch-all clause warranting relitigation where "other circumstances make it appropriate").
No court has adopted the limitation. Currie later decided it was unnecessary, at least where
the court made a detailed inquiry into the circumstances of the former judgment. Currie,
Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 28-30 (1965). Professor James
doubts whether the initiative is that great an advantage. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
11.34 (1965). In any event, courts have overcome whatever problems the common party's
lack of initiative in the prior action might pose. By concentrating on the common party's
opportunity and incentive to litigate in the prior action, courts are able to avoid the disadvantages of lack of initiative which the common party might otherwise suffer. See notes 10819 & accompanying text infra.
90. The possibility of asserting collateral estoppel based on aberrant or inconsistent
results has worried critics of unilateral use since Bernhard See Currie,supra note 1, at 289
("we have no warrant for assuming that the aberrational judgment will not come as the first
in the series"). But see Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation,
402 U.S 313, 331-32 (1971) (assuming judicial uncertainty in the first case, what reason is
there "to expect a second district judge or court of appeals would be able to decide the issue
more accurately"); Vestal, supranote 89, at 51.
The concern intensifies, of course, when inconsistent judgments actually have occurred.
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Initially, the question is whether the law should enforce a rule
which places on one of the parties to an action the burden of possible

loss of fifty actions, as opposed to an opponent's risk of loss of only a
single action. In large part, a rule placing this burden on the common
party in the first action merely formalizes the practical effect, discussed
previously, that a prior case has on subsequent cases. 9 1 Given this
practical effect, the common party would have a great deal of incentive
to mount the most effective case possible in the first action, even absent
the availability of unilateral collateral estoppel. Thus, unfairness, if
See Nickerson v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221, 224 (D. Del. 1965);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185
(1976); Polasky, supra note 1, at 248 (inconsistent results show "the issue has not been decided and that collateral estoppel is inapplicable in a trial action involving that issue"). One
court has held that if a prior plaintiff has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate
and has lost, the plaintiff is precluded by collateral estoppel in subsequent actions, even !f the
decision in the action which the plaintiff lost is contradicted by actions in which the plaintiff
won on the same issue. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 547 (5th Cir.
1973). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 179-233 infra. The second Restatement, however, uses inconsistency as only a possible ground for denial of preclusive
effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(4) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
Both Restatements hold that where a series of cases which includes the same issue takes
place between the same parties, the last in time is that which applies. RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 42 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973). The justification for this rule is that the party against whom the issue was decided in
the last action could have (1) asserted estoppel based on a prior action had he or she thought
the judgment in that action of sufficient strength to support an estoppel, and (2) saved the
court's time had he or she invoked that prior judgment. Note that under § 88(4) of the
second Restatement, the test of § 41.2 does not necessarily apply to the unilateral use of
collateral estoppel. See Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 18, 474 P.2d 329, 335 (1970), stating
that unfairness might result from application of collateral estoppel in the "multiple claimant
anomaly" situation, but that such unfairness should not result in refusing to apply collateral
estoppel. Isolated unfairness is not a sufficient reason for an absolute requirement of mutuality.
As to the desirability of application of unilateral offensive collateral estoppel in mass
tort situations, see Overton, supra note 1,at 942-43. Overton generally objects to the unilateral use of collateral estoppel in situations where the party sought to be bound did not have
the initiative in the prior action. Nevertheless, Overton draws an exception for the mass tort
situation, reasoning that the common defendant has sufficient motivation in the first action,
knowing of prospective future plaintiffs and of the great amount of potential recovery, and
that the common defendant lacks any realistic expectation of winning future suits because of
the emotional appeal of mass accident claims. The second purported justification may not
be empirically sound and is not a legally valid premise. If a defendant has no realistic
expectation of winning, why even litigate the first action? See generally text accompanying
note 94. As to the validity of Overton's distinction, see Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine,
119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P.2d 70 (1953), which, on its facts, presents all the advantages
Overton sees in applying collateral estoppel in the mass tort situation except for a large
number of plaintiffs.
91. See notes 79-82 & accompanying text supra.
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any, results not from collateral estoppel, but from the practical workings of the procedural system.
The common party's disadvantage is, in any event, more apparent
than real. A plaintiff seeking X in damages (or a defendant defending
against a claim of X) is in an unenviable position when opposing a
defendant who has 10 X at risk (or a plaintiff who has 10 X in claims at
risk). 92 Other things being equal, the defendant with 10 X at risk will
resources
be much more highly motivated and more willing to commit
93
for litigation than the plaintiff who has only X to lose.
Given this high degree of motivation in the first action, the common party, absent obstacles beyond that party's control, has every incentive to present the best case possible in the first action. If victorious
in that first action, the common party has every reason to continue that
course in future litigation; if unsuccessful, subsequent actions involving
the same issue are likely to have the same adverse result. Unilateral
use of collateral estoppel thus binds the common party, assuming the
prior action meets the Parklane standards, on the basis of an action
92. At least one authority has reasoned that the disparity between the parties' incentives is so disadvantageous as to be unfair to the first plaintiff. Reardon v Allen, 88 N.J.
Super. 560, 572, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965). Actually, however, this disparity aids the common
party in a different way; it creates an incentive for joinder, mitigating the possibility of collusion between all the subsequent multiple parties and the first, Ze., the first plaintiff will have
an incentive to institute a class action to equalize the litigation resources available or to
attempt to encourage others to join the action. Contra, CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty,
supra note 1, at 1045 (arguing that offensive unilateral collateral estoppel could mean the
demise of class actions). For a discussion of absentees who take a wait-and-see attitude, see
notes 123-46 & accompanying text infra.
93. Commentators have argued that the common party's incentive may be increased so
much that unilateral collateral estoppel actually increases litigation. For further discussion
of that argument, see notes 120-22 & accompanying text infra. For example, Moore and
Currier have argued that because of this enhanced incentive suits that might have been
compromised, defaulted, or dropped may be litigated instead. Moore & Currier, supranote
1, at 309-10. Yet one would assume that unless the opposing party were so weak that the
common party could expect victory on all common issues, the common party's incentive to
settle would be increased rather than decreased. See Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 10, 474
P.2d 329, 334 (1970) (party opposing multiple claimants likely to put best foot forward and,
if a particular case was tactically disadvantageous, would have great incentive to settle).
Related to Moore and Currier's argument that unilateral collateral estoppel will induce,
rather than discourage, litigation is the argument that broad application of collateral estoppel will increase litigation by intensifying the common party's effort in the first litigation.
Polasky, supra note 1, at 220. This argument ignores the policy of settlement underlying
collateral estoppel. The more thoroughly an issue is litigated in the first action, the less
likely that it will be raised in the later actions, no matter what the result of the first action.
Thus, although unilateral collateral estoppel may increase the intensity and scope of litigation in the first action, it promotes both private planning and long term judicial economy.
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which represents the best one can reasonably expect of the common
party. No unfairness results from such a practice.
The Conundrum of "Contradictory"Conclusions
The objection to estopping common party 0 from relitigating in
the twenty-seventh action is not based solely on the parties' asymmetry
of risk. It also may rely on the assumption that irreconcilable judgments have occurred. The argument underlying this assumption is that
binding 0 to a decisionmaker's adverse conclusion is unfair when an
equally authoritative decisionmaker has concluded to the contrary.
While the argument is sound, the assumption often is not. Indeed, to
assume that the common party's losing action is a mirror image of the
winning actions is to take an unrealistic view of the process of litigation. No rational defense counsel, knowing that the common plaintiff
had won twenty-five cases, would court a similar disaster by conducting
case twenty-six in the same way that the previous twenty-five unsuccessful defendants conducted theirs.
Instead, a rational defense attorney would persist in defending action twenty-six only if he or she believed that the case could be
presented more effectively than previous cases. 94 That the defendant in
action twenty-six succeeded, despite the losing efforts of predecessors,
can only indicate that the attorney's belief was well-founded.
The resulting inconsistency between prior actions should bar the
use of collateral estoppel only when the inconsistency cannot be explained on the basis of differences in the underlying trials. When a true
inconsistency occurs, there is no good reason to conclude that the judicial system has arrived at one result instead of its opposite. Hence,
relitigation of the issue may be warranted. The mere possibility that an
inconsistency has occurred, however, should not be used to justify relitigation generally.
The court in Schwartz v. Public Administrator95 provided the
proper allocation of burdens for determining when collateral estoppel
normally would be appropriate: "[T]he burden rests on the [common
party] to show that collateral estoppel should not be applied because he
did not have a full and fair opportunity. . . just as the burden of showing that the issue was identical and necessarily decided rests upon the
'96
moving party."
94. See Vestal, supra note 89.
95. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, (1969).
96. Id at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
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Analogously, in an action where one of several multiple parties,
Af, asserts unilateral collateral estoppel on the basis of a prior judgment against the common party in an action X, which is inconsistent
with the judgments favoring the common party in actions A 1 to A., Af
should be required to show:
(1) that Al's contentions on issue I, which necessarily was decided
in action X and upon which M seeks collateral estoppel, are identical
with those made by the successful party in X on that issue; and
(2) either (a) that there is a material difference between the contentions of M in the present action and those of the multiple parties in
actions A 1 through An such that there is a substantial possibility that
any given factfinder would decide issue I differently in the present action (as in action X) than in actions A 1 through An; or (b) that to allow
the same common party to avoid collateral estoppel by citing actions
A,1 throughA n as inconsistent with Xis inequitable because actions A 1
to 4 n suffered from infirmities that would prevent multiple parties from
relying on their results had the judgment in those actions been against
the common party (e.g, that the multiple claimant had inadequate incentive to fully litigate the actions because of the amount at stake).
Upon that showing by the multiple party, the common party
should have the burden of refuting the contention that the court should
rely on X as a basis for unilateral collateral estoppel, by rebutting the
multiple party's contentions or by otherwise relying on the criteria in
97
Parklane.
After discussing the offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel,
this Article applies the test presented to cases dealing with apparently
irreconcilable judgments. An analysis of decisions by the Supreme
Court of Oregon in a series of negligence cases 98 and decisions by the
federal courts in a series of patent cases illustrates the application of the
test. 99
Prior Decisions as Sword Rather than Shield
Even among those courts i ° and commentators 01 accepting unilat97. See notes 39-45 & accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 147-75 & accompanying text infra.
99. See notes 178-274 & accompanying text infra.
100. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 329-30 (1971); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 669-70 (6th Cir. 1973); Zdanok
v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Nevarov v.
Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 774-75, 327 P.2d 111, 119 (1958). Contra, Gorske v. Commercial Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Barbour v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.,
143 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. I1. 1956); Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, 119 Cal. App. 2d
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eral use of collateral estoppel, the distinctions between offensive and

defensive use remain.10 2 Offensive application of unilateral collateral
estoppel against defendants who were losing parties to prior actions is

objected to on the grounds that: (1) it could permit a plaintiff to bind
by collateral estoppel a defendant whose loss in the prior action may

have been caused by tactical disadvantages, 10 3 rather than infirmities 0in5
his or her case;' °4 (2) it would increase rather than reduce litigation;
(3) it would encourage prospective plaintiffs to postpone their actions

until favorable decisions are rendered against the common defendant
or defendants; 0 6 and (4) it would, as discussed, cause unfairness in the
multiple claimant situation. 0 7 The three new objections warrant fur-

ther discussion.
125, 259 P.2d 70 (1953); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 146-47, 225 N.E.2d 195,
198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 600-01 (1967); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 17, 474 P.2d 329, 337
(1970).
101. See Currie, supra note I, at 307: Polasky, supra note 1, at 246; Vestal, supranote 89,
at 43-76 (1964); Note, CollateralEstoppel in MultistateLitigation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1590
(1968); Note, CollateralEstoppel-The Demise ofMutuality, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 724 (1967);
CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty,supra note 1. Contra, Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at
306-07.
102. Although offensive use may mean either use by a party bearing the burden of persuasion on an issue or use by a party seeking affirmative relief, this Article uses the term to
refer only to the latter. Application of collateral estoppel in this latter situation would include all the problems presented by application in the former situation and, therefore, if
collateral estoppel is appropriate in the latter situation it is afortiori appropriate in the
former.
103. Examples would be inadequate incentive to litigate the prior action, e.g., Berner v.
British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1965), and lack of
choice of forum, Currie, supra note 1, at 303-04; Semmel, supra note I, at 1468-69. Although the proposal of mutuality as a remedy for the problem of prior tactical disadvantages
also appears in the context of defensive use of collateral estoppel, we address it here because
it is the context of offensive use where the problem is most acute. See Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 330-31.
104. Professor Currie has argued that a common party who did not have the incentive in
the first action may not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action.
Currie, supra note 1, at 303-04. Currie later abandoned this reservation, at least insofar as
the court in which the estoppel is asserted examines the common party's position and incentive in the prior action. Currie, Civil Procedure. The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25,
28-30 (1965).
105. See, e.g., Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 301-09.
106. Semmel, supra note I, at 1473-74. There is the additional worry that the plaintiffs
may collaborate among themselves, but that their collaboration will fall short of that required to bind them as controlling the litigation. Currie, supra note I, at 288. However, the
defendant probably will be aware of this possibility and, in any event, will have ample
incentive to make his or her own best arguments early. Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 474
P.2d 329 (1970). See notes 79-82 & accompanying text supra (discussing tactical advantages
of winning the first litigation).
107. See notes 89-93 & accompanying text supra. See Currie, supra note I, at 281.
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The Problem of PriorImpfefect Procedure

One pro-mutuality argument which many courts have rejected is
that unilateral collateral estoppel is universally inappropriate because
the losing defendant may have been victimized by strategic or tactical
disadvantages peculiar to the forum.'08 This argument, in essence, is a
plea for reforming our law of venue or jurisdiction, rather than a criticism of unilateral use of collateral estoppel. The sensible accommodation of this concern is not to forbid unilateral use of collateral estoppel
entirely but to disallow its use in those cases where detectable jurisdictional or venue defects actually have occurred.
The courts have attempted to avoid reliance on prior actions which
suffered from major flaws for which the common defendant cannot
fairly be held accountable by asking if the common defendant had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action.10 9 While certainty is not possible, the courts which adopted the Bernharddoctrine
prior to Parklane ensured in this manner that the prior decision was
made as well as could reasonably be expected. The Parklane Court
adopted the test, although not by name, by incorporating it into the
criteria for the application of offensive unilateral collateral estoppel. In
so doing, the Court noted that problems addressed by the test are more
likely to occur when offensive use is being considered. 110
One way of ensuring that the decisionmaking system of the prior
trial functioned reasonably well is to check whether the common defendant had a sufficient amount at stake, or could have anticipated the
effect of the first action on subsequent actions, to create a sufficient
incentive to have mounted the most effective possible case."' Similar
factors are the inconvenience of a forum which the common defendant
108. Currie, supra note 1, at 321. For further discussion, see note 61 & accompanying
text supra.
109. E.g., Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1200 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1965); Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); Nevarov v. Caldwell,
161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767, 327 P.2d 111, 115 (1958); see CollateralEstoppel by a onarty,
supra note 1, at 1036-37.
110. 439 U.S. at 329, 330-31.
I11. Compare Jordahl v. Berry, 72 Minn. 119,75 N.W. 10 (1898) (recovery of $29.00 in
two prior actions; no binding effect in action for $5,000-vexf though mutuality would have
been satisfied) with Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 346 M. 266, 178 N.E. 146 (1931)
(where defendant in instant action recovered $139.35 from instant plaintiff in prior action in
justice court; plaintiff in this action held estopped to claim defendants' negligence). See also
Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606-07, 375 P.2d 439, 441, 25
Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1965) (prior action in which instant defendant prosecuted for crime
carrying possible prison sentence provided sufficient incentive to litigate).
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did not choose," 2 whether the common defendant has evidence to put
forward that, despite diligent efforts, was not uncovered for the first
trial," 3 whether the common defendant could not have realized the
existence of other prospective plaintiffs,114 or whether the court can de-

tect a finding or conclusion in the prior judgment for which there is no
possible explanation." 5 In cases in which none of these narrow factors
is relevant, the courts nevertheless have asked whether offensive appli6
cation of unilateral collateral estoppel is unfair or unjust." 1
Critics have argued that this test is so thorough that it is impracticable.117 Yet no court which has adopted the test has ever found it
sufficiently unworkable to abandon it. Nor does the time required by
112. In Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court, in declining to
apply collateral estoppel, noted that the current defendant did not have the choice of forum
in the prior action. Id at 990. It was unlikely that this factor was in itself decisive, however,
because there was substantial doubt as to what the prior action had decided.
113. See Continental Can Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 364,
303 A.2d 976 (1973); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 728 (E.D.
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), aft'd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
114. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964). Cf.Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2d
Cir. 1965) (relying in part on the fact that Zdanok-which allowed offensive use of collateral
estoppel-had not been decided at the time of the first action and that therefore the Berner
defendant at the first trial was not able to anticipate the consequences of a loss to the instant
plaintiff).
115. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 333 (1971): "[A]ppropriate inquiries would be whether the... determination [of
invalidity] purported to employ the [obviousness] standards. . .[and] whether the opinions
filed by the District Court and the reviewing court, if any, indicate that the prior case was
one of those relatively rare instances where the courts wholly failed to grasp the technical
subject matter and issues in suit .. ."See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust
Co., 200 Tenn. 513, 292 S.W.2d 749 (1956); Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wash. 2d
109, 117, 431 P.2d 961, 966 (1967). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS,

Reporter's Note at 174 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
116. See Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. I,11, 474 P.2d 329, 334 (1970); Schwartz v. Public
Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 73, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 962 (1969). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(8) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). See notes 39-45
& accompanying text supra (the Parklane standards). For examples of inquiries into the
various problems with unilateral estoppel, see Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482
F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973); Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir.
1965); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964);
In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 1978);
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853 (D. Kan.), af'dper
curiam, 459 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1972); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298,
304 (D. Md. 1967); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D.
Wash., D. Nev. 1962), afd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 9-51
(1964); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225
N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
117. See, e.g., Greenebaum, supra note 1,at 16-17: Semmel, supra note 1, at 1471.
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the thoroughness of the test outweigh the advantages received through
the application of collateral estoppel. 118 Moreover, once offensive use
of collateral estoppel is adopted, incentive to litigate will rise concomitantly, mitigating the possible effect of strategic disadvantages in the
first action." 9
The Problem of Reluctant Plaintiffs

Despite the arguments of the critics of Bernhard, allowing plaintiffs to assert collateral estoppel against defendants who previously
were unsuccessful on the matter at issue is not likely to result in a material increase in litigation. 20° In fact, allowing offensive use probably
would decrease the total time that courts and private parties spend in
litigation. The argument that offensive use would encourage suits by
those who otherwise would not sue assumes first that plaintiffs in a position to take advantage of collateral estoppel are aware of decisions
against the common defendant. Given this knowledge on plaintiffs'
part, whether there would be a difference in the number of suits filed in
a jurisdiction applying unilateral collateral estoppel and in a jurisdiction that refused to do so is questionable.
Plaintiffs are aided substantially by prior judgments on the same
issue against a common defendant even without the finality and certainty of using collateral estoppel. Whatever stare decisis effect the
prior action will have should operate in the new plaintiffs favor.
Moreover, the new plaintiff in effect will have an accurate reconnaisance of the common defendant's position.12 ' Offensive use of unilateral estoppel therefore would induce new claims only from those
plaintiffs unwilling to bring suit in a very favorable situation, but willing to litigate when, as to the issues involved, the result is certain. Consequently, while there is a theoretical possibility of an increase in the
number of cases filed, any actual increase seems unlikely. Moreover, to
the extent that use of collateral estoppel induces plaintiffs to seek vindi118. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 347-49 (1971).
119. Cf. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir.
1965) (common party had less incentive to litigate prior to Zdanok, which indicated that
collateral estoppel could be used offensively). See Polasky, supra note 1, at 248 (estoppel
should only be applied where later suits are foreseeable).
120. A related argument is that unilateral estoppel would increase litigation because
common parties would be compelled to litigate matters with greater force. See note 93
supra.
121. See notes 79-82 & accompanying text surpra.
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cation for actual wrongs which otherwise would go without remedy, the
resulting litigation is not without merit.
By definition, application of collateral estoppel against previously
unsuccessful defendants will reduce the amount of court time spent in
determining issues previously decided. When this savings is balanced
against the minimal potential increase in the number of claims, the
time consumed in litigation as a whole should be reduced. 122
The Problem of PatientPlaintffs
The weightiest objection to offensive use of unilateral collateral
estoppel is that it discourages joinder by encouraging those planning to
sue regardless of other litigation to await favorable results in prior
suits. This argument-that offensive use is an evil because it encourages a wait-and-see attitude-rests on several questionable assumptions: first, that joinder is a good thing in every case; second, that the
availability of offensive, unilateral collateral estoppel materially
reduces the prospect of joinder; third, that the procedural system permits one to assume a wait-and-see posture; and fourth, that taking advantage of an action in which one did not participate is either unfair or
inevitably results in unnecessary, duplicative litigation.
Is Intervention Always Desirable?
The desirability of intervention,1 23 from the standpoint of absentees, turns on whether the issue that the first action has in common with
succeeding actions is one of fact or law. To the extent that rules of law
established by the first action would be controlling in subsequent actions, incentive to intervene in the first action is strong. 24 A prospective plaintiffs only means to avoid or mitigate a controlling effect
122. Cf Polasky, supra note 1,at 220 (noting that collateral estoppel does not reduce the
number of cases tried; it narrows the issues).
123. This discussion puts aside, for the sake of clarity, the question of whether a court
will allow intervention if the intervenor's contribution would merely be cumulative. See,
e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1944)
(holding that intervention was properly denied where proofs and arguments were merely
cumulative). Cf Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51
F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943) (discussion of adverse effects of joinder of parties; intervention granted). The cases which deny intervention when the would-be intervenor makes a
merely cumulative contribution pose a problem for those who criticize the unilateral application of collateral estoppel. If the absentee cannot join, the absentee's motive-even if
based on the availability of collateral estoppel-is immaterial.
124. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964) (court more willing to apply collateral estoppel offensively where issue is basically
one of law). Cf. Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (ruling collateral
estoppel inapplicable in part because issue decided was one of fact).
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126
would be by intervening' 25 or possibly by filing an amicus brief.
When the common issue is one of fact, incentive to intervene is markedly less, but not necessarily because the prospective plaintiff unfairly
wants to adopt a wait-and-see strategy. There are legitimate reasons
for a prospective plaintiff not to join a lawsuit.
Intervention often poses problems, both for the prospective intervenor and for the judicial system. For example, intervention may cre127
ate confusion between the parties' proofs or theories of recovery,
prejudice one co-party by association with the other, 128 excessively
complicate the legal issues in the original case, 129 or open the door to
similarly situated parties whose intervention will cause one or more of
these problems.1 30 Moreover, intervention otherwise desirable may be
125. Cf. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964) (noting that, on an issue of contract construction, multiple claimants would hale little
or no advantage in setting up a series of actions).
126. One may question the likelihood that trial courts would be prepared to accept the
possible multiple claimants as amici, especially where they would not be bound. But see,
e.g., Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 972,
973 (D. Mass. 1943).
127. One court denied intervention because the intervenor presented different questions
of law and fact as to damages, even though, as to liability, the claims had many common
questions of law and fact. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d
564,567 (7th Cir.), cert.denied,375 U.S. 834 (1963). Accord, Allen v. County School Bd., 28
F.R.D. 358, 365-66 (E.D. Va. 1961) (intervention by United States not permitted, in part,
because intervention would require court to interpret state law it otherwise need not consider). Cf. Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1977) (realtor seeking commission allowed to intervene in punitive buyers' action for housing discrimination;
additional evidence, if any, would not be extensive nor much of a burden for the court);
Payne v. Weirton Steel Co., 397 F. Supp. 192, 196-97 (N.D. W. Va. 1975) (once intervenors
adopted original complaint, possible delay was surmounted).
Commonwealth Edison suggests that potential intervenors with distinct damage claims
must consider the possibility that intervention might be more costly than prosecution of a
separate suit. Although intervenors' costs of trial probably may be less as to liability issues,
there is no savings as to damage issues and the trial as a whole is made more expensive to
the extent that intervention lengthens it. Finally, of course, any benefits of intervention for
the court and the parties must be weighed against the potential for jury confusion on varied
damages issues.
128. See United States v. Ward, 416 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court refused to
allow intervention because "potential for divergent legal strategies" might prejudice original
party).
129. Where the intervention would raise new legal issues, many courts will deny intervention. E.g., Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Cox, 379 F. Supp. 299, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 47 F.R.D. 294,298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (effect of additional
contentions in complicating the original plaintiff's action and raising collateral issues causes
sufficient prejudice and delay in existing actions to deny intervention; intervention denied).
Accord, Allen v. County School Bd., 28 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D. Va. 1961).
130. Courts themselves have been concerned about admitting intervenors where admitting them could entail allowing a large number of others. Utah v. United States, 394 U.S.
89, 95-96 (1969); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1100, 1101
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impractical because of the inconvenience of the forum. Thus, intervention is desirable only when plaintiffs' theories of recovery and proofs
are substantially identical and when there is a forum convenient to all
parties.
Intervention is inherently attractive in that, ordinarily, it would
result in lower litigation expenses for an intervenor than would the
prosecution of a separate lawsuit. 13 1 Further, joinder may promote judicial economy in those cases in which the intervenor otherwise would
bring a separate suit. These desirable features of intervention nonetheless must be considered, in any given case, in light of the problems just
discussed.
Does Offensive Use Materially Discourage Joinder?
The availability of offensive collateral estoppel is likely to discourage joinder only in the case where the common issue is a factual one.
Where questions of law are involved, the incentives for intervention
essentially are unaffected by the availability of offensive collateral estoppel. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not increase or decrease the precedential effect of prior decisions. Although collateral
estoppel on issues of law theoretically might increase the binding effect
on the common defendant, the practical impact would be slight given

the low possibility of distinguishing a prior decision on an identical
32

issue. 1
When questions of fact are involved, the decision whether to inter(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Accordingly, a reasonable would-be intervenor would worry lest the principle on which he or she is allowed to intervene in turn may allow so many other intervenors
that litigation of his or her own interests becomes impractical.
131. The desirability of intervention for this reason should not be taken lightly.
Chances are that the person who decides not to intervene is placed at a disadvantage vis-Avis the common party, because the non-intervenor's marginal cost of litigating his or her
action may well be greater than the marginal cost to the common party, who can spread his
or her costs as to the common issue across all the multiple parties' actions. Assuming equal
financial status, the non-intervenor is placed at a disadvantage for settlement negotiations
and for the litigation as a whole, because he or she will have to expend more resources to
conclude the litigation. Cf. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.25, at 582 (2d
ed. 1977). A rational non-intervenor would need a belief of increased advantage in separate
litigation to do this. Cf.In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999,
1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("[a]s a practical matter, an extremely small percentage of persons seek
exclusion from a class and to be represented by their own counsel," especially where the
individual claims are "small").
132. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 149 (1979). For a discussion of Montana,
see note 23 supra. This increase in binding effect of litigation on legal issues does not unfairly disadvantage common parties. That the common party would be able to distinguish
legal precedent established in the first of a series of cases posing identical issues would be
extremely unlikely. Therefore, the common party, acting rationally, would have maximum
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vene may well be influenced by the availability of offensive collateral
estoppel. A judgment favorable to the common defendant is no more
disadvantageous to succeeding plaintiffs when offensive collateral es-

toppel is available than when it is not, given that those plaintiffs are not
formally bound by the prior decision. 133 If the issue in the prior case is
adjudged against the common defendant, however, offensive collateral

estoppel gives subsequent plaintiffs a great benefit, namely, the ability
to bind the previously unsuccessful common defendant as to the issues

34
on which he or she was unsuccessful.1
The prospective plaintiff nonetheless must balance this benefit
against the cost of bringing a separate action. Joining an ongoing action is less expensive than prosecuting a separate claim. A rational prospective plaintiff thus will join in the prior plaintiff's action, if
feasible,135 unless the prospective plaintiff's theory of recovery or strat-

egy differ from the first plaintiffs in a way making joinder undesirable
36
under the criteria just discussed.1

Is a Wait-and-See Posture Feasible?
The wait-and-see argument assumes either that the statute of limi-

tations will not run while the subsequent plaintiffs are waiting or that a
court will stay actions until the first action is litigated. The first proposition, given the current delay in litigation, 137 is dubious. Judges' concerns about judicial administration would seem to make the second
138
proposition unlikely.
Does the Problem of the Patient Plaintiff Justify a Wholesale Refusal to
Allow Offensive Use?
Assuming that the availability of offensive, unilateral use does enincentive to dispute legal issues in the first of a series of multiple claims, even were collateral
estoppel not allowed.
133. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ml.Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
134. Eg., In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D.
IM. 1978); Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, 119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P.2d 70 (1953).
135. See note 131 & accompanying text supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 127-30 supra. This assumes that the prospective
plaintiff would sue on his or her own if he or she did not intervene in the prior action and
the plaintiffs in that action lost. If he or she would not sue, there would be no increase in
litigation.
137. See generally Bell, Crisis in the Courts: ProposalsforChange, 31 VAND. L. REv. 3,
4-5 (1978); Phillips, The Expansion of FederalJurisdictionand the Crisis in the Courts, 31
VAND. L. Rnv. 17, 24 (1978).

138. See, e.g., Will, JudicialResponsibility/or the Disposition of Litigation, 75 F.R.D.
117, 124-25 (1976).
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courage a wait-and-see posture, the practice requires a check on offensive, unilateral use only to the extent that the posture is unfair or an
undue detriment to judicial economy. Wallflower plaintiffs do create

an asymmetry of risk in that the common party stands to lose more in
any given action than does his or her opponent. As already noted,
however, the disadvantages of asymmetry are more apparent than

real

39

and are not in themselves so undesirable as to require mutual-

ity.' 40 Further, the wallflower plaintiff cannot be said to be acting ineq-

party when intervention
uitably by deferring a battle with the common
14 1
would have created problems of its own.

Admittedly, a wait-and-see posture, to the extent it is possible,
would increase the number of claims and thus appear to undermine
judicial economy, The amount of the increase, however, is easy to exaggerate. First, if the prior plaintiff is unsuccessful, the risk averse
wait-and-see plaintiff might settle or otherwise let the claim lapse-an
efficient result. 142 Second, if the prior plaintiff is successful, settlement,
rather than more litigation, is the likely result. The amount of addi-

tional litigation that does occur is, by definition, litigation justified on
the merits and may produce less strain on the judicial docket than that
occasioned by joinder in the first litigation. Unless these prospective
intervenors have essentially identical claims, strategies, and preferences

of forum, their attempt to join will not promote judicial economy but
will result in separate proceedings designed to avoid inconvenience and

confusion.
The problem remains that offensive collateral estoppel marginally
139. See notes 91-93 & accompanying text supra.
140. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1394-98
(1976). See also In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ili.
1978).
141. See notes 127-31 & accompanying text supra. See Semmel, supra note 1, at 1479
(pointing to factors such as inconvenient forum, co-party with whom interventor might not
want to associate, juries' hesitancy to award too large a sum against one defendant in any
one trial, convenience of clients or witnesses). See also In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec.
Litigation, 455 F. Supp 999 (N.D. 11. 1978): "[Tlhere are many possible reasons-apart
from 'waiting on the sidelines' to see what happens in a class action-why class members
might elect to exclude themselves. To not apply collateral estoppel because the opt out
plaintiffs might be 'waiting on the sidelines' would undermine the important policy reasons
for applying collateral estoppel. Courts which have enforced the offensive use of collateral
estoppel have not considered the motives of those plaintiffs who, though not joining in the
first lawsuit, seek the benefit of the judgment in a subsequent lawsuit. This court will likewise not indulge in exploring the motives of the opt out plaintiffs who seek to assert collateral estoppel based on [a prior action]. . . . The overriding considerations are whether the
defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the [prior] proceedings and whether
judicial economy would be served by an application of collateral estoppel." Id at 1008.
142. Vestal, supra note 89, at 56.
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discourages intervention 143 that might save judicial time. 144 The
Supreme Court in Parkane has attempted to resolve this problem by
stating that parties who have failed to join in an action, although they
could have done so easily, cannot assert collateral estoppel against the
common opponent who was unsuccessful in the prior action.' 45 As
long as this criterion is narrowly construed to preclude estoppel only
when joinder was truly easy, rather than merely feasible, such a rule
should prove satisfactory. Prospective plaintiffs who had no real risk of
confusion and no significant additional burden in intervention should
be foreclosed under the "could easily have joined" rule. Although efficiency may well be served if the wait-and-see plaintiff can bind the
common defendant (the costs involved in determining the wait-and-see
plaintiff's rights may be minimized), if the prior plaintiff is unsuccessful, the succeeding plaintiffs' lawsuits may have to be tried completely.
favors encouraging intervention
Thus, the balance of convenience
46
when it is easily available.'
143. Semmel, supra note 1; CollateralEstoppel by a Nonpary, supra note 1.
144. Some commentators have made unilateral collateral estoppel's effect on intervention a major test of its desirability. E.g., Semmel, supra note 1, at 1457-75, 1479; Collateral
Estoppel by a Nonparqy, supra note 1, at 1024-35, 1038, 1045. This misses the mark. The
availability of unilateral collateral estoppel, whether offensive or defensive, logically would
encourage the common party to seek compulsory joinder. See Currie, supra note 1, at 287.
Cf. Comment, Class 4ctions in SuitsforPatentInfringementin Light ofBlonder-TongueLaboratories,Inc. v. Universiy of Illinois Foundation, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1473,
1483-86 (1972) (abrogation of rule of mutuality of collateral estoppel in patent cases will
encourage patentee-plaintiff to seek joinder of alleged infringers). See generaly Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARv. L. Rnv. 630, 631-32 (1978). It also encourages the earlier
parties to seek joinder with others to equalize incentive and resources. Thus, the criticism of
offensive collateral estoppel-or unilateral collateral estoppel generally-really argues more
for broadening compulsory joinder than denying collateral estoppel effect. Cf. Staten Island
Rapid Transit Ry. v. S.T.G. Constr. Co., 421 F.2d 53, 58 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
951 (1970) (government need not be joined in action involving contract financed with federal aid); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee" 19664mendments ofthe Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 365-66 (1967) (absentee's failure to
attempt to intervene shows lack of prejudice to absentee cognizable under the federal rules).
In any event, it is probably naive to assume that the first of a series of multiple litigants has
not been chosen by a group of potential litigants or does not have individual reasons for
initiating the litigation. See cases cited at note 79 supra.
145. Note, however, that courts often make similar determinations in venue cases, in
that venue rules are based on the convenience of the parties. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939). A district court recently has stretched "easily" to the breaking point by assuming, without investigating, that joinder by the absentees
would have been "easy." In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F. Supp. 174
(S.D. Fla. 1979).
146. Even in the case of the wait-and-see plaintiff, "the requirement that the 'party
against whom the estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most
significant safeguard' for defendants." In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455
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The Analysis Restated
Collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy, prevents harassment, and, most importantly, aids in the ordering of extra-judicial relationships. There is no reason that collateral estoppel cannot be used
unilaterally and offensively to serve those purposes if, in each case, the
use is measured against the Parklane criteria and found satisfactory.
The criticisms of the Bernhardrationale, to the extent the Parklane test
does not incorporate them, are characterized by a number of questionable empirical assumptions and, by the fact that even if true, they are
relevant to reform in the entire procedural system rather than to the
marginal decision whether to allow unilateral offensive collateral estoppel.
With specific reference to the problem of superficially inconsistent
judgments, of which an example follows, offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel should not be denied simply because of apparently inconsistent judgments. This is subject to certain qualifications.
Assuming that the Parklane standards otherwise are satisfied, the nonparty seeking the estoppel must show either that there is a difference
between his or her contentions and those of the multiple parties in actions inconsistent with the result sought, or that to allow the common
party to cite certain actions as inconsistent with the result sought is inequitable because of infirmities in those actions that the common party
could have raised had the actions resulted in judgments adverse to him
or her.
The Analysis Applied to an Ordinary Civil Case
In a relatively recent Oregon case the Oregon Supreme Court
could have applied the analysis set out above to its advantage. The
case involved an assertion of offensive unilateral collateral estoppel and
a counter-argument that prior inconsistent judgments on the identical
issue prevented the use of collateral estoppel.
The facts in State FarmFire& Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc.147 seem as close to the classic multiple claimant hypothetical' 48 as any which fate is likely to provide. Plaintiffs' property was
stored in a warehouse approximately sixty feet from defendant Century's shed and was connected to the shed by a wooden loading dock.
F Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
I1l. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
147. 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976).
148. See note 89 supra.
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Century customarily deposited sawdust into a box placed at the side of
its shed. 149 One night, Century's janitor dumped a mixure of linseed
oil and dry sawdust into the box. The next morning, when no employees were on the premises, a fire started. The fire spread and caused
substantial damage to the warehouse, its contents, and Century's shed.
Over fifty actions were filed against Century to recover for losses from
the fire, alleging Century's negligence with respect to the origin and
spread of the fire. The cause of the fire and its point of origin were
contested by all parties.150
The first of the cases resulted in a jury verdict for defendant Century.15 1 On appeal, in Pac'c Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Century
Home Components, Inc. 15 2 (PaccNorthwest Bell 1), the Supreme
Court of Oregon reversed, finding error in the lower court's failure to
compel production of a statement the plaintiff needed to impeach a
defense witness.
During the pendency of the appeal in PacificNorthwest BellI, the
second case, Sylwester v. CenturyHome Components, Inc. , was tried.
The plaintiff in Syiwester apparently had two theories of negligence:
first, that the fire started in Century's skip box by spontaneous combustion and that Century was negligent in creating a condition that would
cause spontaneous combustion; and second, that regardless of the cause
of the fire Century was negligent in failing to maintain its premises or
to prevent their use by others to avoid the risk of a fire which would
spread to the adjoining property.154 Plaintiff in Sylwester emphasized
spontaneous combustion of the contents of the box as the basis of liability. 155 Judgment was for Century. No appeal was taken.156
Plaintiffs in the third case, Hesse v. Century Home Components,
Inc.,157 took a different tack from their unsuccessful predecessor in
Syiwester. The Hesse plaintiffs alleged both that Century negligently
caused the fire' 58 and that Century negligently maintained its premises
149. 275 Or. at 101, 550 P.2d at 1187.
150. Id
151. The plaintiff apparently argued that defendants negligently maintained the property so as to create a risk of fire by spontaneous combustion. Id at 111, 550 P.2d at 1192.
152. 261 Or. 333, 491 P.2d 1023, modfed, 261 Or. 333, 494 P.2d 884 (1972).
153. No. 92582 (Or. Cir. Court, Lane County). The only readily available source of
information about the Syiwester litigation is the State Farm opinion.
154. 275 Or. at 111-13, 550 P.2d at 1192-93.
155. Id at 111, 550 P.2d at 1193.
156. Id at 102, 550 P.2d at 1187.
157. 267 Or. 53, 514 P.2d 871 (1973).
158. Id. at 55, 514 P.2d at 872. This allegation was later abandoned. Id
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in the condition that resulted in the fire.159 The jury found for plaintiffs
60
and Century appealed; the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed.'
The Pacific Northwest BellI case thereafter was retried to the court
without a jury. The trial court held, in Pacffc Northwest Bell v. Century
Home Components, Inc. 161 (Pacific Northwest Bell I1), that Century
was liable on the theory that by storing the sawdust as it did it negligently created a risk of fire. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court
62
affirmed. 1
After entries of final judgment in Sywester, Hesse, and Pac~c
Nrorthwest Bell II, the thirteen plaintiffs in State Farm filed amended
and supplemental complaints conforming to the allegations in Hesse
and Pacific Northwest Bell I and asserted that the prior judgments estopped Century from relitigating the question of liability. The trial
court agreed. 163 The Oregon Supreme Court reversed on the basis of
the inconsistency it perceived between Century's victory in Sy/wester
and its losses in Hesse and Pacific Northwest Bell I1. The court first
noted that the Sywester, Hesse, and PacficNorthwest BellII suits each
had included claims by the plaintiffs of negligence in storing the sawdust at all as well as in storing it in such a manner that if a fire started it
would spread to the warehouse. 164 Based on these similarities in the
issues, the court viewed the disparity in the results of the three prior
65
trials as preventing collateral estoppel effect.1
The court in State Farm failed to note one logical basis for the
difference in results between Sywester, on the one hand, and Hesse
and Pacific Northwest Bell 11, 166 on the other. Century presented evidence that some young boys had admitted smoking in another trash
box near Century's building, that they were responsible for a fire in the
other box on the same night as the fire in issue, that they were in Century's building the night of the fire, and that they slept that night on the
lawn of one of their homes about two blocks from Century's shed. 6 7
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
include
167.

Id
Id
267 Or. 46, 514 P.2d 874 (1973).
Id
275 Or. at 102, 550 P.2d at 1187.
Id at 111-13, 550 P.2d at 1192-93.
Id at 114, 550 P.2d at 1194.
Cf. Vestal, supra note 89 (in determining preclusion, court's consideration should
analysis of the nature of the issues involved).
Hesse v. Century Home Components, Inc., 267 Or. at 59-60, 514 P.2d at 874. Al-

though no reported opinion indicates that evidence that boys caused the fire was introduced
in the Syiwester case, it is logical to assume that the defendant introduced this type of evi-

dence, given the plaintiffs emphasis on spontaneous combustion.
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Given the presence of this evidence, it seems likely that the Hesse and
Pacfc Northwest Bell II plaintiffs' choice of pleading had a decisive
influence on the result. Once the claim against Century no longer
rested on a theory of spontaneous combustion, as did the plaintiffs
claim in Syiwester, evidence that the boys possibly started the fire was
much less damaging to the plaintiffs' case. When the plaintiffs shifted
the emphasis from the precise cause of the fire to whether Century was
negligent in maintaining the skip box as it did, Century had to show
not only that the boys caused the fire, but that they did so intentionally. 168 This obstacle made Century's case substantially more difficult. 169

Plaintiffs' shift of emphasis not only mitigated the effect of defendant's evidence, but may have turned that evidence to plaintiffs' own
advantage. That is, if Century knew or had reason to know, prior to
the fire, of the boys' initial presence on its property and their starting
the fire in the other trash box, Century arguably was negligent in failing to prevent their0 trespass, which created an increased hazard of fire
on the premises. 17
In any event, the question arises whether Sylwester should be
treated as an inconsistent result for purposes of preventing collateral
estoppel effect. Some $21,000 was at stake in Sylwester as compared to
approximately $147,000 in Pacfc Northwest Bell 1J.171 Further, Century had procured, at considerable expense, additional experts to testify
on its behalf in the larger litigation. 172 Thus, had the result reached in
Syiwester been unfavorable to Century and asserted as the basis for
collateral estoppel by the plaintiffs in Pacfc Northwest BellI!, Century
could have argued strongly that the prior trial did not provide a full
and fair opportunity to litigate, or that under Parklane'srubric the proposed use of collateral estoppel would be unjust in that the incentive to
168. See Hesse v. Century Home Components, Inc., 267 Or. at 58-59, 514 P.2d at 873-74.
169. The opinions in Pacfc Northwest Bell I imply there may have been additional
evidence that the boys started the fire.
170. Seegeneral Arne v. Schnitzer, 173 Or. 179, 144 P.2d 707(1944); Aune v. Oregon
Trunk Ry., 151 Or. 622, 51 P.2d 663 (1935). The difference in result between Syiwester and
the subsequent cases also can be explained on the basis of jury confusion over the Sywester
plaintif's emphasis on the contention that the fire started by spontaneous combustion. Emphasis on spontaneous combustion by plaintiff was damaging to plaintiffs case in light of the
evidence of the boys' starting the fire. The emphasis in Hesse and PacfcNorthwest BellI1
on negligent use of the skip box avoided confusion of the two issues. See notes 83-88 &
accompanying text supra.
171. 275 Or. at 114, 550 P.2d at 1194.
172. Id
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litigate was inadequate in Sy/wester. 173 Both the disparity in the
amounts at issue and the additional evidence that Century offered in
Pacific Northwest Bell II would indicate that Century's arguments
174
would have been difficult to ignore.

The Oregon Supreme Court should have applied collateral estoppel despite the superficial inconsistency between the judgments of liability in Hesse and Pacific Northwest Bell II and the judgment of
nonliability in Sywester. 175 Because the plaintiffs in Hesse and Pacific
Northwest Bell I emphasized Century's negligence in permitting a fire

to occur and dropped the potentially confusing theory of spontaneous
combustion, they almost certainly presented their cases significantly
more effectively than did the plaintiff in Sywester. 176 Moreover, the
173. Arguably, a court should closely examine prior results unfavorable to the multiple
plaintiff in an action with less at issue than the current multiple plaintiffs action against the
common defendant, because it is less equitable to hold one of the claimants disadvantaged
by one with whom he or she only shares the bond of an arguable misfortune than it is to
hold the common defendant accountable for his or her own actions in prior litigation.
174. See note 109 supra, citing cases supportive of this exception to collateral estoppel.
The cases, which mention an exception to unilateral collateral estoppel where the common
party's incentive to litigate in the prior action was inadequate, are not based on reasoning
that the trial process itself is inadequate or that the result of the prior action was incorrect.
Cf. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 114, 550
P.2d 1185, 1194 (1976) (declining to consider which of prior cases was better tried). If that
were the basis of the exception, the cases would condemn collateral estoppel outright or at
least would attempt to examine the correctness of the prior result, which the courts have not
done. The basis of that exception therefore must be that there is reason to believe that the
common party might not have litigated the prior action as effectively as he or she could
have.
175. Department of Transp. v. Jewett, 28 Or. App. 521, 559 P.2d 1312 (1977) is a second
case which may have failed to apply collateral estoppel correctly. In 1952 Oregon realigned
a highway along the eastern boundary of the property of the four landowners. A landslide
occurred in 1974, apparently falling on part of each of the four parcels. Some four months
after the landslide, the State brought four condemnation actions seeking to appropriate the
four parcels. In the first action to be tried, the landowners challenged the State's valuation
of their premises on an inverse condemnation theory, alleging that the State had caused the
landslide by making hillside cuts in a landslide area when the highway was realigned. The
jury returned a special verdict finding that the State had not caused the landslide. In the
second action, the jury found the State had caused the slide.
In the third action, Jewett, the trial court granted, in part, the landowners' motion for
summary judgment, holding that the State was collaterally estopped by the result in the
second action. The trial court's decision was entered prior to the decision in State Farm.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, relying on State Farm. The court dismissed the
Jewetts' contentions that the first case should not prevent application of collateral estoppel
because there was not as much at stake in that case as in the second case and because the
issues in the two prior cases were not presented as fully. 28 Or. App. at 534, 559 P.2d at
1313-14. The court of appeals did not explore the Jewetts' contentions more fully. Thus,
even though the case may have been correctly resolved, it was not well reasoned.
176. See notes 168-70 & accompanying text supra.
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amount at issue in Pacoc Northwest Bell II was several times larger
than that at issue in Syiwester. For this reason, the plaintiff in
Syiwester could not have afforded as vigorous a prosecution of the
claim against Century as the plaintiffs in Pacfc Northwest Bell 1..177
The Oregon court thus had sufficient reason to believe that the contentions of Century's liability had not been as effectively presented in
Syiwester as in the later cases. Therefore, the court should have put
Sywester aside, rather than relying on it as inconsistent and preventing
estoppel of Century in State Farm on the basis of the Hesse and Pacfc
Northwest Bell II cases. An additional reason to refrain from treating
Syiwester as inconsistent is that, had the case been decided adversely to
Century, Century would have had a good chance of avoiding collateral
estoppel based on Sylwester.
The remainder of this Article deals with unilateral collateral estoppel and inconsistency of prior judgments in patent law.
The Analysis Applied to Patent Validity Litigation
While mutuality generally has been in retreat since the time of
Bernhard,its supporters long fought a successful rear guard action in
the field of patent law, particularly in the area of patent validity. 178
From 1936, when the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of mutuality
in Trilett v. Lowell, 179 until 1971, when the court modified Tr#?lett in

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Zlinois Foundation, I80 a patentee whose patent had been adjudged invalid nevertheless was free to relitigate patent infringement actions against parties
who were strangers to that adjudication.18 1
Trolett permitted the patentee to relitigate in the absence of mutu177. See text accompanying notes 133-46 supra.
178. Letters patent, which grant the patentee the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the
patent's subject matter for 17 years, are issued by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office upon a finding that the substantive and procedural requirements of patentability are
satisfied. See generally E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROcEss 797 (2d ed. 1979). For unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale, the patent
holder may bring a patent infringement suit for injunctive relief, damages, and, in extraordinary cases, attorneys' fees. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281, 283-285 (1976). Perhaps because it has
survived some degree of administrative scrutiny, a patent is presumed valid, meaning that
the infringement suit defendant who challenges the validity of the plaintiff's patent must
bear the burden of showing that the subject matter described in the patent and covering the
allegedly infringing material fails to meet the requirements of patentability. 35 U.S.C. §.
282 (1976).
179. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
180. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
181. See Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1936).
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ality, reasoning that patent validity litigation warranted no exception to
the then prevailing rule of mutuality of estoppel. 82 Subsequently,
however, policy reasons were advanced to justify retaining mutuality of
estoppel in patent law while abandoning it elsewhere. 83 These reasons
are simply applications of the arguments of Bernhard's critics to the
unique procedural and substantive aspects of patent validity litigation,
potentially making the arguments for mutuality particularly compelling. The Court in Blonder-Tongue recognized the special weight these
arguments might receive in the context of patent law 1 84 and attempted
to accommodate them without going so far as to require mutuality generally, 185 as did Trolelt. 86 Blonder-Tongue's accommodation has been
criticized, however, largely by arguments that reflect the misapprehen87
sions of mutuality's supporters.
This section briefly reviews the arguments for and against a strict
requirement of mutuality in patent validity litigation, which roughly
parallel the arguments discussed at a more general level in the earlier
182. In Tr#plett, the alleged infringer argued, in effect, that the patentee should be estopped from litigating patent claims because they had been adjudicated invalid in a prior
infringement suit. The Court considered this a novel argument but one which it had implicitly rejected in previous cases. The Court also noted that relitigation of patents seemed to be
the norm. Id at 641-43. Tr.lett did not make law, then, as much as it reaffirmed longstanding practice.
183. A frequently cited reason for continuing to require mutuality in patent cases was
the perceived duty to follow Troplett and to honor the presumed tacit approval of Triplett by
Congress. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Kutschera, 419 F.2d 983, 985 (3d Cir. 1969) (following
Trplett in patent case even though same court did not require mutuality in the tort case of
Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950)); Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d
949, 951 (7th Cir. 1955) (concurring opinion) (disapproving Troplett but leaving any change
to Congress). Nonetheless Troilett was no bar to courts disposed to treat its reaffirmation of
mutuality as dicta overtaken by subsequent legal developments. See, e.g., Technograph
Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 317 (C.D. Cal. 1968);
Nickerson v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1965).
184. 402 U.S. at 332-34.
185. Id at 334.
186. Troilett did recognize one exception: collateral estoppel could be asserted by the
customer of a manufacturer who had secured a judgment of invalidity or noninfringement
against the patentee. This exception was necessary to avoid absurd results. It prevented the
patentee, unable to enforce his or her invalid or noninfringed patent against the manufacturer, from harassing the customer who had purchased the manufacturer's noninfringing
goods. See, e.g., General Chem. Co. v. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc.,
101 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1939). See generaly Evans & Robins, The Demise of Mutuality in
CollateralEstoppel (The Second Round Patent Suit-The Not-So-Instant-Replay), 24 OKLA.
L. REV. 179, 196-98 (1971).
187. E.g., Halpern, Blonder-Tongue: A Discussion andAnalysis, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
761 (1971); Halpern, Blonder-Tongue. A Discussion andAnalysis, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5
(1972); Symposium, Blonder-Tongue v. University of Illinois Foundation-TheDecision and
Its Implications, 1971 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N BULL. 718, 725 (remarks of Mr. Robert Rines).
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analysis of collateral estoppel. 188 It then discusses possible offensive

uses of unilateral collateral estoppel based on prior patent invalidity
judgments. Finally, the section examines in detail a series of cases that

provides an opportunity to demonstrate how inconsistent patent validity judgments should be evaluated after Blonder-Tongue and Parklane
Hosiery.
Unilateral Use of Patent Invalidity Judgments

In patent litigation, as in litigation generally, arguments that favor
mutuality have amounted to a proposal that a requirement of mutuality
be imposed as a safeguard against possible defects in a prior litigation.
The appropriate response, as the Supreme Court indicated hesitantly in
Blonder-Tongue,189 and more enthusiastically in Parklane,19 0 is not to

make relitigation the rule, with mutuality the justification for an exception, but to make preclusion of relitigation the rule, with exceptions to
the rule based only on discernible faults peculiar to the litigation on
188. See text accompanying notes 54-94 supra.
189. Although some of Blonder-Tongue'slanguage is expansive, see, e.., 402 U.S. at 328
("[the broader question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one
full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue"), Blonder-Tongue expressly declined to rule on the merits of the doctrine of mutuality generally. Id at 327.
Both the majority in Parklane,439 U.S. at 327, and the dissent, id at 347 & n.14 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting), noted Blonder-Tongue's possible limits, and several federal courts have attempted to preserve mutuality as to certain issues, despite Blonder-Tongue, on the questionable premise that Blonder-Tongue is confined to issues of patent validity. See, e.g., Divine v.
Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1046-48 (2d Cir. 1974) (Internal Revenue Service not unilaterally estopped from relitigating income tax issue decided against it in a prior judgment);
Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co., 444 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1971) (alternate holding)
(patentee seeking to bring infringement suit not estopped under Blonder-Tongue on basis of
prior judgment holding he lacked capacity to sue; Blonder-Tongue not intended to reject
mutuality entirely); United States v. Anaconda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486, 495-96 (D.D.C. 1977)
(Consumer Product Safety Commission is not unilaterally estopped from asserting jurisdiction over aluminum home wiring, despite prior judgment that Commission lacked jurisdiction); Ransburg Corp. v. Automatic Finishing Systems, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1357, 1366 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (dictum) (applying unilateral collateral estoppel on behalf of infringement suit
defendant would not be justified under Blonder-Tongue, which involved invalidity, not infringement). Cf. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 403 F Supp. 1040,
1045, 1046 (S.D. Ohio 1975) afrd,562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977) (permitting unilateral assertion of collateral estoppel in principle but denying use in part because instant case involved
patent unenforceability due to deliberate fraudulent procurement, not patent invalidity as in
Blonder-Tongue).
190. The language in Parklanerelating to the collateral estoppel aspect of that case is
unqualified: "[W]hether a litigant who was not a party to an earlier judgment may nevertheless use that judgment 'offensively' to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in
the prior proceeding." 439 U.S. at 326. Park/ane, see notes 34-48 & accompanying text
sufvra, together with Montana, see note 23 supra, seriously undermines those decisions, see
note 189 supra, that have sought to limit Blonder-Tongue to its factual and legal setting.
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which collateral estoppel is sought to be based. If serious faults are
thought to inhere in our system of litigation, then the solution is not to
sacrifice the benefits of collateral estoppel on an altar of mutuality; the
solution is to address and remedy the inherent defects directly.

In patent validity litigation, the inherent defect most strongly supporting the argument for mutuality is the extraordinary likelihood of
erroneous decision. The most frequently litigated issue 91 -whether
the patent's subject matter is nonobvious in light of the trade's prior
art-has been characterized as perhaps the most difficult that a court
decides.192 What is more, a great public interest has been asserted in
the need to ensure that valid patents are upheld; 193 if they are not, pro194
spective inventors will be discouraged and innovation will suffer.
Because of the special difficulty and public significance of the patent
validity decision, courts and commentators have reasoned that the patentee who has lost once on the issue of patent validity should have the
95
opportunity to vindicate that patent in subsequent litigation.
191. See, e.g, 3 R. WHITE, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS § 6.03(2), at 630 (1978).
192. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.). But
see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (difficulty of nonobviousness issue
compared to those of negligence and scienter, which courts resolve daily). A patent on a
"process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" is invalid unless its subject matter has the attributes of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976).
When determining whether a patent meets the test of nonobviousness, "the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claim at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved."
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). This inquiry often requires a foray into
technical matters in which the judge is untrained. "When all is said, we are called upon
imaginatively to project this act of discovery against a hypostatized average practitioner,
acquainted with all that has been published and all that has been publicly sold. If there be
an issue more troublesome, or more apt for litigation than this, we are not aware of it."
Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). Accord, Nyyssonen v.
Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531, 532 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1965).
193. See Sinclair & Carrol Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 & n.1
(1945).
194. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 977-78 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 281 F. Supp. 704, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
195. "It is just as important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be
definitely stricken. At the same time it must be remembered that the issue of patent validity
is often 'as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts. . . .' The theory of unilateral estoppel would, however, bite
sharply into the current process for sustaining good patents and rectifying erroneous holdings." Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(quoting Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950)). See Agrashell,
Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 281 F. Supp. 704, 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Halpern, BlonderTongue." 4 Discussion andAnalysis, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 5, 6, 12 (1972); Rollins, In Rem
Invalidity.- A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 561, 570 (1970) (reliti-
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In Blonder-Tongue, the Court rejected the argument that patent
validity judgments should be open, without qualification, to relitigation

against new parties. The Court reasoned that the possibility of erroneous judgments of invalidity was minimized by the patentee's opportu-

nity to avoid collateral estoppel by showing the lack of a "fair
substantively, and evidentially to pursue his
opportunity procedurally,
196
claim the first time."'

The opportunity for showing substantive defects in the prior trial
differentiates Blonder-Tongue from Bernhard,which confined the focus

of the collateral estoppel inquiry to the procedural fairness of the first
trial. 197 The Blonder-Tongue test thus creates more uncertainty than
would application of the test in Bernhard.19 This degree of uncertainty, however, does not approach that created by the patentee's ability to relitigate against any new party. 199 Blonder-Tongue did not
gation needed to correct erroneous patent validity judgments). See also Comment, BlonderTongue Bites Back- CollateralEstoppelin PatentLidgation-A New Look, 18 VILL. L. REv.
226,
228-29 (1972) (Blonder-Tongue oppressive in that it magnifies, while failing to
207, 217,the
"rectify,
perceived
problem that some circuits follow erroneous patent validity standards).
196. 402 U.S. at 333. The Court provided the following factors to consider: "In addition to the considerations of choice of forum and incentive to litigate mentioned above,
certain other factors immediately emerge. For example, if the issue is nonobviousness, appropriate inquiries would be whether the first validity determination purported to employ
the [proper] standards. . .; whether the opinions filed by the District Court and the reviewing court, if any, indicate that the prior case was one of those relatively rare instances where
the courts wholly failed to grasp the technical subject matter and issues in suit; and whether
without fault of his own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the
first litigation. But as so often is the case, no one set of facts, no one collection of words or
phrases, will provide an automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end,
decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity." Id at 333-34.
197. "Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in
the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?" 19
Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. Some subsequent courts have used a broader set of inquiries.
E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1965) (relitigation allowed for want of incentive to litigate the first
time). Nevertheless, none seems to go as far as does Blonder-Tongue in permitting substantive review of the prior decision. See, e.g., Technograph Printed 'Circuits, Ltd. v. MartinMarietta Corp., 340 F. Supp. 423, 425-28 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973), which applied the factors set forth in Blonder-Tongue and allowed assertion of collateral estoppel against a patentee only after a thorough quasi-appellate review of the prior court's decision.
198. See Note, Blonder-Tongue. Abrogation of Mutuality Requirement/orDefensive Use
ofCollateralEstoppelin Patent InfringementSuits, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 287, 296 (1971). But
see authorities cited note 199 infra.
199. The inquiries permitted by Blonder-Tongue actually are quite narrow. They contemplate that the second court ask only whether the prior court "wholly" failed to grasp the
technical subject matter and whether the court "purported" to apply the appropriate standards for nonobviousness. New evidence may justify relitigation only if the patentee can
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represent an effort to remove uncertainty of decision altogether; as with
collateral estoppel generally, Blonder-Tongue sought simply to remove
uncertainty to the maximum extent possible, while avoiding manifest
unfairness to the common party. In so doing, Blonder-Tongue achieves

its primary goal: encouraging reliance on adjudications of patent invalidity by those contemplating investment in economic activities that
would likely infringe the patent were it valid.2°°

This interest in promoting private planning in reliance on judicial
decisions underlies both Blonder-Tongue and collateral estoppel generally. Blonder-Tongue may be criticized from the standpoint that it precludes only a few trials 20 ' or that it actually may undermine judicial

economy by encouraging more vigorous litigation at the initial trial and
20 2

a higher frequency of appeals from the decisions rendered therein.
This criticism, if valid, 20 3 does not condemn the decision. Blondershow it is "crucial" and that he or she was deprived of it without fault in the first litigation.
402 U.S. at 333. Blonder-Tongue does state that there is no "automatic formula for proper
rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense
of justice and equity." Id at 334. But courts have been reluctant to apply this language to
permit relitigation, preferring instead to rely on the traditional "full and fair" factors discussed at text accompanying notes 109-19 supra. See Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 978-79 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 876 (1976); Note, After
Blonder-Tongue. Back to the Laboratory to Finda Patent Validation System Even a Court
Could Trust, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 295, 317 (1974).
200. See notes 55-60 & accompanying text supra. See generally Lieberman & Nelson, In
Rem Validit--A Two-Sided Coin, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 9, 19-20 (1970) (single patent validity adjudication aids future planning).
201. See, e.g., Rollins, In Rem Validity: A Solution in Search ofa Problem?, 52 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'" 561, 568-71 (1970) (in period studied, only 2.7% of patents were relitigated annually, and only 20% of the total number of patents litigated were involved in more than one
suit).
202. See Halpern, Blonder-Tongue: A Discussion andAnalysis, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5,
18 (1972); Rollins, In Rem Validity. A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 52 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 561, 584 & n. 53 (1970). Cf. Kidwell, Comity, Patent Validity, and the Searchfor
Symmetry: Son of Blonder-Tongue, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 473, 487-89 (1975) (ironically,
Blonder-Tongue may discourage challenges to patent validity; before Blonder-Tongue, the
alleged infringer who won a judgment of patent invalidity had a competitive edge over other
potential infringers who still faced substantial risk of suit; now, alleged infringer who litigates may emphasize noninfringement, not invalidity, in order to leave patentee free to enforce patent against the alleged infringer's competitors).
203. While Blonder-Tongue may encourage more vigorous litigation and appeals once
litigation has begun, it undoubtedly precludes relitigation. It also discourages initial litigation, since it increases the risk of loss to the patentee. See Note, After Blonder-Tongue: Back
to the Laboratoryto Finda Patent Validation System Even a Court Could Trust, 16 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 295, 321 (1974). Blonder-Tongue may save additional judicial time by encouraging class action suits by the patentee. The patentee cannot assert a prior judgment of
patent validity against a new infringer, e.g., Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 678 (10th Cir.
1971), yet, because of Blonder-Tongue, he or she takes the risk, in any patent validity litigation, that that new infringer will be able to use an adverse judgment against him or her. The
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Tongue did not aim to clear court calendars, but rather to promote

decisions. Judicial economy is a salutary but
predictability of judicial
24
incidental benefit. 0
The strongest criticism of Blonder-Tongue, however, has not been
that it fails to promote judicial economy but that it permits the application of collateral estoppel against a patentee whose patent has been invalidated by a court that applied an improperly strict standard of
patent validity. According to this criticism, Blonder-Tongue's provision
for some substantive review is inadequate to ensure against a patentee
20 5
being treated unfairly by courts with an allegedly anti-patent bias.
Because standards of patent validity differ so widely from one circuit
court of appeals to the next, this argument runs, relitigation 20is6 needed
as a safeguard against improvident judgments of invalidity.
This argument may be addressed at several levels. First, one may

challenge its basic assumption that some courts are "anti-patent" and
that the result of a given patent validity litigation therefore depends on
the circuit in which it is brought.20 7 A second response to the argument

is that, even absent collateral estoppel, a patentee who has lost once on
patentee therefore has little to lose and much to gain by joining the new infringer as a
defendant in a class action. See Comment, Class Actions in Suitsfor PatentInfringementin
Light ofBlonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1473 (1972); Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back- CollateralEsoppel in PatentLitigation-A New Look, 18 VILL. L. Rav. 207, 234-42 (1972).
204. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
348-49 (1971).
205. See authorities cited note 195 supra.
206. See authorities cited note 195 supra. "[A]s a result of Blonder-Tongue, no opportunity will be presented to correct... improvident determinations because even incorrect
decisions may be pleaded as collateral estoppel." Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back.CollateralEstoppelin PatentLitigation-A New Look, 18 VILL. L. Rv. 207, 228-29 (1972).
It is true that an incidental benefit of permitting relitigation was that the inconsistencies
created thereby could occasion Supreme Court review. But this obviously is no justification
for requiring mutuality. First, permitting relitigation as a roundabout approach to the perceived problem of inconsistent patent validity standards does not guarantee that the Court
will review patent validity cases, for the Court has denied certiorari in such cases. See Lieberman & Nelson, In Rem alidiy--4 Two-Sided Coin, 53 L PAT. OFF. Soc'y 9, 25 (1970).
Second, the Court has reviewed patent cases without requiring a conflict between the circuits
on a specific patent, see id, and there is no compelling reason why it could not do so again if
it observed that inconsistent rules of patent validity were being applied. Thus, here, as elsewhere, mutuality is no solution to procedural problems; the remedy can be applied directly.
207. The assumption that courts are anti-patent stems from the high percentage (5060%) of patents sued on being held invalid. See, e.g., Gausewitz, Brie/ in Support of ProposedAmendments to Section 103, Title 35, Patents, U.S. Code, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 290,
291-92 (1969). One might expect a relatively high percentage of litigated patents to be ruled
invalid, however, assuming that only patents of doubtful validity are likely to be litigated.
Moreover, the high percentage of invalidity rulings may reflect not that some judicial standards of patentability are too high but that the standard under which the Patent and Trade-
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the issue of patent validity is at a practical and legal disadvantage in a
subsequent litigation. Subsequent challengers to patent validity would
have ready access to the previous challenger's winning case, and courts
applying the comity doctrine would accord "great weight" to the prior
decision of invalidity. 20 8 Third, it is doubtful that the proposed solution-relitigation against any new party the patentee chooses to pursue-is germane to achieving a correct result. As the Supreme Court
stated in Blonder-Tongue: "[A]ssuming a patent case so difficult as to
promote a frank admission of judicial uncertainty, one might ask what
reason there is to expect that a second district judge or court of appeals
'20 9
would be able to decide the issue more accurately.
Further, assuming that continued relitigation could somehow ensure a correct result, the benefit could not justify the unquestionably
high cost of absolute certainty. As noted in Blonder-Tongue, Triplett's
rule of unfettered relitigation enabled the holder of an invalidated patent to stifle competition or exact royalty payments from manufacturers
unwilling or unable to sustain the extraordinarily large expense of defending a patent infringement action. 210 Moreover, under Troplett,
those who challenge a patent only to have it upheld as valid would be
at an unfair disadvantage in competing with those who had secured a
21 1
judgment of patent invalidity.
The benefit offered to justify the expense of relitigation is scant.
Admittedly, a rule which permits relitigation despite the absence of any
manifest error or defect in the prior proceeding may result in some
mark Office issues patents is too low. See, e.g., Sears, Tinkering with the Invention StandardNo Solution to Problems of Patent Quality, 59 MINN. L. REV. 965, 965 (1975).

The assumption that circuits vary widely in their standards of patentability stems
largely from statistics that purport to show some circuits invalidating almost every patent
considered while other circuits invalidate no more than half. Comment, Blonder-Tongue
Bites Back: CollateralEstoppelinPatentLitigation-A New Look, 18 VILL. L. REV. 207, 227

(1972). These studies are questionable, both because they rest on an insufficient sample and
because there is little likelihood that the patentees studied possessed the same claims to
validity. Horn & Epstein, The Federal Courts' View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 134, 143-48 (1973). See also Kananen, Comments and Observationson Res Judicata and Patent Law, 18 CASE W.L. REV. 103, 122 (1966) (collateral estoppel "may well

operate to narrow interpretational differences between circuits in patent matters"); Richards
& Clapp, Recent Developments in PatentLaw, 1970 PAT. L. ANN. 197 (increased efforts to-

ward uniformity among courts).
208. See Kananen, Comments and Observations on Res Judicata and Patent Law, 18
CASE W.L. REv. 103, 119 (1966); Evans & Robins, The Demise of Mutuality in Collateral
Estoppel (The Second Round Patent Suit-The Not-So-Instant Replay), 24 OKLA. L. REV.

179, 194 (1971).
209. 402 U.S. at 331-32.
210.
211.

Id at 338.
Id at 346.
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rulings of patent validity which would have been impossible to reach
had the alleged infringer been able to assert unilateral collateral estoppel. Even assuming that these patents should have been ruled valid,
is large or that
there is little indication that the number of such patents
212
the effect on the patent system will be substantial.
Hence, concerns about a hostile or incompetent patent judiciary
and a lack of uniform standards of patentability are best focused on
proposals for procedural reform or on renewed efforts by the Supreme
Court to review standards of patent validity. 213 To the extent these reforms are truly needed, unilateral collateral estoppel admittedly may
help in some cases to perpetuate a "bad result." To impose a requirement of mutuality as a solution to this problem, however, would be a
case of burning the house to roast the pig.
Offensive Use of Patent Invalidity Judgments
Although Blonder-Tongue expressly declined to consider the propriety of offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel,2 14 Parklane endorsed offensive use except where (1) the plaintiff could have easily
joined the earlier action; (2) the defendant had insufficient incentive to
litigate the first action; (3) the defendant in the second action had procedural opportunities that could readily cause a different result; or (4)
the judgment relied on is inconsistent with a judgment in defendant's
favor. 215
Parklane thus enhances the likelihood of three varieties of offensive use of prior patent invalidity judgments, none of which is now generally realized. The first example of such offensive use would be in a
declaratory judgment action brought by a potential infringer against a
patentee whose patent previously was ruled invalid. 216 The second
would be a royalty refund action brought by a patent licensee. 217 The
212. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM394 (1971). But see Halpern, Blonder-Tongue: 4 Discussion andAnalysis, 54 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 5, 21 (1972) (Blonder-Tongue results in threat to patent system); Kidwell, Comiy,
Patent Validity, andtheSearchforSymmetry: Son ofBionder-Tongue,57 . PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
473, 487-89 (1975) (Blonder-Tongue reduces value of valid patents).
213. See Note, JudicialInvalidation of Patent Bars Suit Against Different Infringer, 50
TEx. L. REv. 559, 565-66 (1972).
214. 402 U.S. at 330.
215. 439 U.S. at 331-32.
216. Eg., Hickory Springs Mfg. Co. v. Freedman Bros. Furniture Co., 303 F. Supp. 978,
980-81 (D. IMl.1971), ar7donothergrounds, 509 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975) (relying on BlonderTongue to apply unilateral estoppel on behalf of declaratory judgment act plaintiff attacking
validity of patent previously declared invalid in infringement suit).
217. It has been held that a patent licensee has no obligation to pay royalties bnce the
ANCE
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third and most dramatic would be a treble damage antitrust claim
brought against a patentee who would be liable for monopolization but
for his or her patent. 2 18 Although one of Parklane's exceptions to of-

fensive use may be implicated in any given case, no inherent aspects of
patent litigation would appear to prevent these offensive applications of
unilateral collateral estoppel.
Parklane's "could have easily joined" exception, as suggested,
should be construed narrowly. 21 9 It should have no application at all
when the prior action is a patent infringement action, for intervention
on the side of the patent challenger necessarily subjects the intervenor

to liability. The same can be said when the prior action is an action for
patent is finally adjudicated invalid for want of invention, but he or she is unable to sue for a
refund of royalties he or she paid while the patent was presumed valid. Troxel Mfg. Co. v.
Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972). Dicta in several opinions, however, are
to the effect that where the patentee procured his or her patent as a result of deliberate
misrepresentations to the Patent Office, the patent is void ab initio and the licensees, even
though they enjoyed the protection of the patent throughout the term of the licensing agreement, can sue for a full refund. E.g., Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530
F.2d 508, 514-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1259 (6th Cir. 1972); Nashua Corp. v. RCA Corp., 431 F.2d 220,
227 (Ist Cir. 1970); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979, 981 (D. Del.
1947).
218. In Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1956),
the Supreme Court held that an infringement suit defendant could bring an antitrust counterclaim on the basis that the patentee-plaintiff had procured the patent through deliberate
and material fraud, and that, but for the patent, the patentee would be liable for monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Although involving a counterclaim, Walker
Process also seems to be authority for a plaintiffs antitrust suit. See Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc. 601 F.2d 986, 989-90 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's antitrust theory based on
fraudulent procurement of patent dropped for want of evidence). See generally Monsanto
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 595 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972)
(dicta) (noting no Supreme Court case stands in way of private suit to annul patent on
ground of fraud on Patent Office); In re Multidistrict Litigation Involving Frost Patent, 398
F. Supp. 1353, 1366 (D. Del. 1975), modKed, 540 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1976) (dicta) (Walker
Processconcerned not with infringement action but with antitrust suit) (by implication). But
see P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 248 (1975) ("only as a defense or counterclaim to a suit for patent infringement is fraud in the procurement. . . . assertable by a
private party").
The Fourth Circuit considered applying unilateral collateral estoppel on behalf of a
Walker Processplaintiff in North Carolina v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976). The trial court had denied plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Blonder-Tongue did not benefit antitrust plaintiffs. 537 F.2d at
72. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment, but not because a prior
judgment of fraudulent procurement could not be used by a subsequent antitrust plaintiff.
Rather, the Fourth Circuit determined that the defendant lacked a full and fair opportunity
to litigate inasmuch as the prior judgment was the result of a Federal Trade Commission
proceeding in which defendant had lacked the safeguards accorded in a conventional trial.
Id at 72-73.
219. See notes 143-45 & accompanying text supra.
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a declaratory judgment of invalidity, for the intervenor would be subject to a counterclaim for infringement.
The patentee's incentive to litigate should not differ significantly
from an infringement or declaratory judgment action to a subsequent
royalty refund or declaratory judgment action. The incentive to litigate
may be more substantial, however, in a treble damage antitrust action.
Nevertheless, significantly higher stakes in subsequent actions do not
mean that incentive to litigate vigorously necessarily was lacking in the
first. If the figure at stake in the first action was high enough to submit
the patent's validity to judicial decision, then the patentee-antitrust defendant in the subsequent action should be required to demonstrate
what would have been done differently had the stakes been even
higher. And the new strategy, unavailable because of lack of incentive
in the first action, must be shown to have been capable of changing the
result in that action. 220
The third Parklane exception applies where there are procedural
opportunities available in the second action that were absent in the
first. Lack of procedural opportunities can hardly be a problem if the
first action was an infringement action brought by the patentee. 22 1 In
such a case the patentee would have had the choice of forum, within
the restrictions placed by venue requirements. 222 A patentee may be
able to show the initial forum was inconvenient, however, if the first
action was a declaratory judgment action with the patentee as a defendant. If so, the patentee should still be required to show that the
lack of choice of forum could "readily [have] cause[d] a different result. ' 223 For example, the location of the forum may have made production of persuasive evidence too expensive. Allegations that the
220. Courts have consistently rejected the patentee's argument that he or she lacked
incentive to litigate. E.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 535 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
221. A patent also may be found invalid in an administrative proceeding, where the
safeguards afforded the patentee may substantially differ from those enjoyed in a court.
Nevertheless, those differences alone should not preclude collateral estoppel. Rather, they
should be examined in light of the proceeding's facts to determine whether they could readily have caused a different result. North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67, 73-74
(4th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 870 (1976), took too rigid an approach in declining to apply
offensive collateral estoppel on the basis of a prior Federal Trade Commission adjudication.
The court noted the differences between Federal Trade Commission proceedings and standards and those of a court, but did not explain, in the light of the facts of the case, how these
procedural differences were likely to have affected the outcome.
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1976). Cases applying Blonder-Tongue against the patentee who has lost in a prior infringement suit have routinely cited choice of forum in that suit
as a factor in the decision that the patentee had a fair chance to litigate. See, e.g., Wahl v.
Vibranetics, Inc., 474 F.2d 971, 976 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973).
223. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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particular forum was hostile or "anti-patent," however, should not be a

significant factor in this determination. Any problem with erroneous
patentability standards should be handled case-by-case, within Blonder-

Tongue's provision for some substantive review.
A similar case-by-case approach should apply to Parklane'sfourth
exception, which might preclude collateral estoppel in instances where
inconsistent judgments have occurred. Any analysis of that exception
as it relates to patents can only be undertaken in light of BlonderTongue. The next section takes up that analysis in detail, after first
concluding that Blonder-Tongue does not require a court either to ignore inconsistent judgments or to treat them as universally sufficient

justification for relitigation.
Inconsistent Judgments of Patent Validity: A Question Left Open in
Blonder-Tongue
The nature of patent litigation makes any patent infringement suit
the first in a potential series of suits with one issue in common: the
patent's validity. The possibility of inconsistent judgments on this issue
is substantial even after Blonder-Tongue. A ruling of patent validity
has no collateral estoppel effect against a subsequent alleged infringer;
a ruling of patent invalidity may be avoided by the patentee if he or she
can show a lack of full and fair opportunity to litigate under BlonderTongue's broad "full and fair" test. Although Blonder-Tongue might
be read expansively to cover the situation where prior inconsistent
judgments have occurred,224 neither the facts of that case nor its rea224. The scope of Blonder-Tongue's endorsement of unilateral collateral estoppel is in
some doubt as to prior inconsistent judgments. Much of the language in Blonder-Tongue is
general and not expressly limited to an instance in which the only prior judgment concerning patent validity was a judgment of invalidity. The Court noted: "Thus, we conclude that
Tronlett should be overruled to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing
charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declaredinvalid." 402 U.S. at 350
(emphasis added). On the other hand, Blonder-Tongue contained language that arguably
does relate to factors such as prior inconsistent judgments: "No one set of facts, no one
collection of words or phrases, will provide an automatic formula for proper rulings on
estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice
and equity." Id at 333-34. See Comment, Plaintoftina PatentInfringement Case is Estopped
From Claiming Patent's Validity Despite Previous Decision Upholding its Validity *hen an
Intervening Decision Has Declared the Patent Invalid, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 343, 347 (1974)
(language quoted indicates application of collateral estoppel may be unfair even after a full
and fair litigation). Accord, Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 1040, 1045 (S.D. Ohio 1975), aft'd, 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977). But see Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 1973) (trial court's "sense ofjustice
and equity" should extend no further than an examination of whether potentially estopped
party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate).
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soning resolve the problems that prior inconsistent judgments may
pose. Blonder-Tongue was heard pursuant to a writ of certiorari to the
Seventh Circuit, which had ruled a patent valid notwithstanding the

Eighth Circuit's ruling, in a prior suit, that the patent was invalid. 225
Thus, the question presented in Blonder-Tongue was not whether collateral estoppel was appropriate after inconsistent judgments, but
whether it would have been proper to assert collateral estoppel as a
defense in the action below in light of the prior judgment of invalidity.226

The Court held that an assertion of collateral estoppel would

have been proper and remanded the case to permit the defendant to

amend its pleadings and to allow the district court to consider whether

collateral estoppel would be appropriate under the circumstances.2 27
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Blumcraft of
225. The University of Illinois Foundation, the holder of a patent for a color television
antenna, brought an infringement suit in Southern District of Iowa against an antenna manufacturer. After trial, the district court ruled the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103, on
the ground it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. University of Ill. Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1967), aj'd,402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.
1968), cer. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969). Prior to the ruling of patent invalidity in Winegard,
the Foundation filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois against a customer of BlonderTongue Laboratories, Inc., alleging infringement of the same color television antenna.
Blonder-Tongue intervened to defend its customer, asserting as one of its defenses that the
patent was invalid. Winegard was decided before judgment was had, but Blonder-Tongue
did not assert that the Winegard decision estopped the Foundation from relitigating patent
validity, presumably because a patentee's ability to relitigate under Tr7i1eu seemed clear.
After trial, the court, in an unreported decision, ruled the patent valid and infringed, the
Winegarddecision notwithstanding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in relevant part, University of Ill. Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1970),
and Blonder-Tongue successfully sought certiorari. 400 U.S. 864 (1970). The immediate
occasion for review appeared to be the conflicting determination between the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits. The Supreme Court never addressed this conflict, however;, rather, it invited the parties to discuss whether an alleged infringer, such as Blonder-Tongue, should be
permitted to invoke against a patent holder-plaintiff a prior finding of patent invalidity. 402
U.S. at 317, 320 n.6.
226. Although Blonder-Tongue involved a possible assertion of defensive collateral estoppel with respect to the issue of patent validity, its rationale would extend easily to offensive use, particularly in light of Parklane, see text accompanying notes 33-48 supra. See,
e.g., Hickory Springs Mfg. Co. v. Freedman Bros. Furniture Co., 303 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Ill.
1971), aff'd on other grounds, 509 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying unilateral estoppel on
behalf of declaratory judgment act plaintifi); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (S.D. Ohio 1975), aff'd, 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977)
(permitting infringement suit defendant bringing antitrust counterclaim to assert unilateral
collateral estoppel). For a discussion of unilateral collateral estoppel use in antitrust actions
based on patent issues see, note 218 supra.
227. On remand, the district court reversed its prior ruling of validity and held the patentee estopped to relitigate patent validity. University of Ill. Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue
1971), aff'dpercuriam,465 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.),
Laboratories, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. 111.
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972).
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Pittsburgh v. Kawneer,228 relied on Blonder-Tongue to estop a patentee
from relitigating a patent that had been declared valid and then invalid
in two separate adjudications. The court reasoned that although this
inconsistency threw the correctness of the prior judgment of invalidity
into doubt, "correctness" was immaterial, since Blonder-Tongue did not
predicate application of collateral estoppel on whether the prior adjudication asserted as the basis for estoppel was correct, but rather on
whether the adjudication was one in which the patentee had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. 229 The court stated that the only issue left
to the district court's discretion was whether the patentee in the action
in which the patent was held invalid had a full and fair opportunity to
230
litigate.
Although acknowledging possible difficulties that its decision
might create, the Fifth Circuit court believed Blonder-Tongue required
it to ignore prior judgments of validity.2 3' The court relied on three
aspects of Blonder-Tongue in reaching this conclusion. First, because
Blonder-Tongue was decided on appeal from a judgment of validity by
the Seventh Circuit which was inconsistent with a judgment of invalidity by the Eighth Circuit, Blonder-Tongue was direct authority for invoking collateral estoppel even where inconsistent judgments have
occurred. 23 2 Second, given that the reason for allowing relitigation after inconsistent judgments is that inconsistency undermines confidence
in the "correctness" of the prior decision, Blonder-Tonguejustified collateral estoppel in that it rejected "correctness" of the prior decision as
the touchstone of collateral estoppel. 233 Finally, because BlonderTongue required that estoppel be applied after an initial judgment of
invalidity, even though subsequent suits might result in judgments of
validity, the result should be no different if the judgment of validity
234
came first.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis notwithstanding, Blonder-Tongue did
228.

482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973).

229.

Id at 546.

230.
231.

Id at 547.
Id at 548 & n.12. According to the Fifth Circuit, even a series of prior judgments

of validity would not justify relitigation but would simply warn the court to examine very
carefully the decision holding the patent invalid to see if the proper legal standards had been
correctly applied. Id
232. Id
233. Id
234. Id at 549. The court made this argument based on its perception that the Blonder-

Tongue Court intended a "knockout blow" at multiplicity of patent litigation. Given that it
made no arguments based on judicial economy or the function of the patent system, the
Kawneer court seemed merely to reiterate its conclusion that the Blonder-Tongue rationale
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not speak directly to the problem of prior inconsistent judgments. Admittedly, the Eighth Circuit ruled the patent in issue in Blonder-Tongue
invalid and the Seventh Circuit later ruled it valid. For the Supreme
Court to reverse the Seventh Circuit, however, is merely for the Court
to say the Seventh Circuit erred in refusing to permit the assertion of
collateral estoppel. To read into Blonder-Tongue as much as the Fifth
Circuit attempted in this regard is tantamount to saying that the
Supreme Court, by reversing the Fifth Circuit court, intended to cover
cases of prior inconsistent verdicts because the judicial economy rationale requires that the Seventh Circuit case not be relitigated. Such an
argument places excessive stress on the judicial economy rationale for
235
unilateral collateral estoppel.
On the other hand, neither did Blonder-Tongue preclude all consideration of judgments of patent validity by applying collateral estoppel after one judgment of invalidity despite the possibility of contrary
judgments in subsequent cases. The objection to invoking collateral
estoppel in the wake of prior inconsistent judgments is not that one
decision is correct and one is not. Rather, the objection is that courts of
equal authority have reached opposite results in cases that are indistinguishable. Therefore, the judicial system as a whole cannot be said to
have reached a decision on the issue involved. If such a situation
arises, then collateral estoppel effect should be denied.
The foregoing suggests not that the Fifth Circuit court necessarily
reached the wrong result in Kawneer, but that it should have examined
the prior adjudications to see if their inconsistency in result could be
explained on the basis of differences in the way the two adjudications
were conducted. In the alternative, the court should have examined
whether the patentee should have been estopped from asserting as inconsistent the prior favorable adjudication, inasmuch as he would have
been able to avoid the collateral estoppel effect of an opposite result in
that adjudication.
Inconsistent Judgment Analysis Applied to a Patent Case: The Tale of
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh

An examination of the cases leading up to Kawneer indicates that
the Fifth Circuit court could have used the proposed analysis to substitute a more satisfactory rationale for its otherwise harsh reasoning. In
each of the cases preceeding Kawneer, Blumcraft of Pittsburgh sought
could be stretched easily to encompass the situation of prior inconsistent judgments. This
argument is unsound. See note 224 & accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 52-60 & accompanying text supra.
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injunctive and monetary relief for infringement of its patented ornamental handrail design. 236 In each case the defendant maintained the
patent was invalid because the improvement was obvious to one skilled
237
in the art.

The saga began in 1966, in Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. United
States238 (Blumcraft I). The trial commissioner of the Court of Claims
to whom the case was referred concluded that the patent was valid and

that the United States had infringed

it.239

The United States and

Blumcraft then agreed that the United States would not take exception
to any of the trial commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of
law, in return for a stipulation limiting the amount of damages Blumcraft could recover. 240 The Court of Claims then granted Blumcraft's
motion to enter judgment and to adopt the opinion of the trial commis24
sioner. 1
236. See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. United States, 372 F.2d 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1967). For a
brief discussion of infringement suits see note 178 supra.
237. The most frequently litigated patentability requirement is nonobviousness of subject matter. See, e.g., 3 R. WHITE, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTIcs § 6.03(2),
at 6-30 (1978). A patent is invalid because obvious "if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1966). There are other substantive requirements of
patentability. A patent on a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"
must be "new and useful," 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), whereas a patent on a design, such as was
involved in the Blumcraft cases, must be "new, original and ornamental." 35 U.S.C. § 171
(1976).
238. 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1976), which authorizes a patentee to recover "reasonable and entire compensation" for the
United States government's unauthorized use of a patented invention. Although the United
States was the only defendant in the 1966 Blumcraft case, the United States was not the only
entity whose interests were implicated. One of the manufacturers of the allegedly infringing
railings was Kawneer Company, which Blumcraft later sued in a separate action. Blumcraft
of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973). Another manufacturer, Architectural Art Manufacturing, assisted the United States in its defense; Blumcraft later sued it,
too. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Kan.
1972).
239. 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
240. See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 1973);
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 341 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See
generaly Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 372 F.2d 1014, 1015 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
241. This form of settlement, as opposed to an extra-judicial settlement, was more advantageous to Blumcraft because of the persuasive or binding effect an adjudication might
have on other parties. A judgment of patent validity was conceivably entitled to the benefit
of the doctrine of controlling decision, see Vestal, Relitigationby FederalAgencies: Conflict,
Concurrence and Synthesis of JudicialPolicies, 55 N.C.L. REV. 123, 130-66 (1977), or the
doctrine of comity, see, e.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300,
1303 (7th Cir. 1976); Ritchie v. Lewis-Browning Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 434, 436-37 (5th Cir.
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In Blumcraft v. Citizens & Southern NationalBank 2 42 (Blumeraft

II), Blumcraft brought another infringement action, this time against
Citizens & Southern National Bank, in whose building allegedly infringing rails had been placed. The district court in Blumcraft II
thought the Court of Claims decision "persuasive," but reached its own
243
independent determination that Blumcraft's design patent was valid.
The bank appealed the court's holdings of validity and infringement
and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, on the basis
244
that the design patent was obvious.

Blumcraft then brought a third suit, Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v.
Kawneer Co.,245 in the Northern District of Georgia to enforce its de-

sign patent against Kawneer Company and several other defendants.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Fourth

Circuit decision in Blumeraft II should be given collateral estoppel effect to bar Blumcraft from relitigating the validity of its patent. Because the defendants would not have been bound by a Fourth Circuit
decision in Blumcraft's favor, this assertion was an argument for unilateral use of collateral estoppel. The district court decided that although

it would have ruled in defendant's favor were the case one of first imin light of the
pression, it must deny the summary judgment motion
246
then current word of the Supreme Court in Tri7lett.
With one case won, one case lost, and one case pending, Blumcraft

brought a fourth infringement suit, Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. ArchitecturalArt Manufacturing,Inc.24 7 (ArchitecturalArt), in the District of
1952); CBS v. Zenith Radio Corp., 391 F. Supp. 780, 786 (N.D. IMI.1975). Cf. Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 286 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.S.C. 1968), rev'd,
407 F.2d 557 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) (following Blumcraqf I which it
found "persuasive").
242. 286 F. Supp. 448 (D.S.C. 1968).
243. Id at 456. Citizens and Southern's defense was controlled by Architectural Art, the
maker of the allegedly infringing rails. Because the trial court held the patent valid, it did
not rule on Blumcraft's contention that the issue of patent validity was resjudicata based on
Blumcraft L Id A subsequent court held res judicata did not apply because the defendant
in that case merely assisted the United States' defense in Blumeraft I; it did not control it.
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Kan.
1972).
244. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 407 F.2d 557, 558-60
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
245. 318 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
246. Id. at 1400. The court noted that there were strong policy reasons against following
Trpilelt, but also noted that Congress had been reluctant to overturn the decision.
247. 337 F. Supp. 853 (D. Kan. 1972). This case might seem to pose a problem seldom
seen in the context of unilateral use of collateral estoppel-a defendant who was assuming a
wait-and-see posture. Architectural Art controlled the defendant's litigation on the Blumcraft patents in the Blumcraft II case, but was not a party. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citi-

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

Kansas. In the meantime, the Supreme Court had decided BlonderTongue, overruling Trolett. The ArchitecturalArt court read BlonderTongue to require that only the invalidity judgment of Blumcraft i be
considered. The court held that Blonder-Tongue applied only to judgments of invalidity and that the judgment in Blumcraft I of validity was
not relevant to whether collateral estoppel could be asserted by Architectural Art. 248 After determining that the Fourth Circuit's judgment
of invalidity in Blumcraft 11 occurred after a full and fair opportunity
for Blumcraft to litigate, the court held that the decision in Blumcraft
11 estopped Blumcraft from relitigating patent validity.249 On appeal
from summary judgment for defendants, the Tenth Circuit Court of
250
Appeals summarily affirmed.
Meanwhile, in Georgia, the defendants in the Kawneer case had
moved for reconsideration of the denial of their motion for summary
judgment in light of the Supreme Court decision in Blonder-Tongue.
The court once more denied the motion, reasoning that although collateral estoppel would otherwise be applicable, the prior judgments were
inconsistent, making collateral estoppel inequitable. 25 1 Defendants in
Kawneer renewed their motion for reconsideration after the lower
court decision in ArchitecturalArt.252 In rejecting defendants' request,
the Kawneer court interpreted Blonder-Tongue to require consideration
of equities beyond those relating to the fullness and fairness of the patentee's opportunity to litigate in the action in which the patent was held
invalid and reasoned that the controlling equitable factor in Kawneer
253
was the occurrence of prior inconsistent judgments.
zens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 286 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.S.C. 1968), rep'd, 407 F.2d 557 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). Nonetheless, this connection bound Architectural
Art as if it actually had been a party to Blumcraft I. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 83, at 44 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). Even if Architectural Art were unable
to invoke unilateral collateral estoppel because of its previous wait-and-see posture, mutual
collateral estoppel would be available. The Kansas District Court held Blumcraft bound on
both res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds. 337 F. Supp. at 859.
248. 337 F. Supp. at 858.
249. Id at 858-59.
250. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 459 F.2d 482 (10th Cir.
1972).
251. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 341 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
The court limited its holding to the facts before it: one prior ruling of validity and one prior
ruling of invalidity. It did not hold that one judgment of validity necessarily would justify
an indefinite number of litigations. The court conceded there would be some point, which it
could not specify, at which the number of judgments of invalidity subsequent to a single
judgment of validity would justify application of collateral estoppel.
252. Id at 1024.
253. Id at 1021-24.
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The court rejected defendants' argument that the Blumeraft I
judgment of validity should not prevent collateral estoppel based on
the Fourth Circuit court's judgment of invalidity. The defendants had
advanced this argument on two grounds: first, the Court of Claims did
not have before it "three important prior art references

. . .

heavily

court;2 54

and second, the United
relied upon" by the Fourth Circuit
States had bargained away its right to appeal the trial commissioner's
opinion to the Court of Claims in return for a limitation of the government's liability. 255 The court considered the differences in evidence
before the Court of Claims and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
but concluded they were not material. 256 The court chose not to consider the effect of the compromise in the Court of Claims case because
it believed a precedent for detailed examination of prior judgments of
time and at best
validity "would result in an expenditure of judicial 257
result in a mere second guess of the prior decision.
Finally, after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the use
of collateral estoppel in ArchitecturalArt, the Kawneer district court
reluctantly relied on the holding inArchitecturalArtand applied collateral estoppel against Blumcraft. 258 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court
application of Blonderof Appeals affirmed on the basis of the rigid
259
section.
this
in
previously
Tongue criticized
Both the Tenth and Fifth Circuit courts were much too rigid in
their consideration of collateral estoppel. Once Blonder-Tongue was
decided, the courts should have engaged in the particularized inquiries
that proper analysis required and of which they were fully capable.
The Blumcraft I judgment of validity by the Court of Claims should
not have been regarded as inconsistent with the judgment of invalidity
in Blumcraft II by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Blumcraft I
was not a litigation; it was an entry of judgment as to liability that the
government had agreed not to oppose in return for Blumcraft's agreement to limit damages. 260 Thus, the government either did not have a
254. Id at 1022.
255. Id
256. Id at 1022-23.
257. Id at 1023-24. "Blonder-Tongue... does not dictate an investigation by this court
into such a factor of a prior holding of validity." Id
258. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
259. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973).
260.

There is little indication that these circumstances of the stipulation in Blumcraft I

were raised in ArchitecturalArt. When the trial court in Kawneer was reconsidering the
motion for summary judgment for the second time, Blumcraft argued that the stipulation in
BlumcraftI related solely to the procedure to be followed in the accounting. 341 F. Supp. at
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262
sufficient incentive to litigate fully, 2 6 1 did not litigate the issue at all,
or the judgment in Blumcraft I should have been treated as a compro-

263
mise verdict.

These circumstances do not necessarily relate to the "correctness"
of Blumcraft I or to the corresponding "correctness" of the contradictory result reached in the Fourth Circuit, but bear directly on whether
there were present in Blumcraft I those components necessary to vigorous presentation of the case for invalidity. 264 The lack of those components is one reason Blumcraft I should not be regarded as establishing

an inconsistency with the result in Blumcraft II, where such compo265
nents were present.
A second reason for refusing to find such an inconsistency is that
had the Blumcraft Ijudgment been against Blumcraft, Blumcraft could

have avoided collateral estoppel based on that judgment by arguing

that its incentive to litigate was dissipated by the settlement. 266 A judgment in Blumcraft's favor where the United States had a similar lack of
incentive to litigate should not prevent collateral estoppel based on
Blumcraft J*.267 Otherwise, a patentee would merely have to find an
alleged infringer with little at stake and little incentive to litigate, overwhelm him or her, and subsequently avoid collateral estoppel no mat268
ter how many times the patent was later held invalid.

1022. The text does not deal with whether the settlement actually was raised, however, both
for the sake of clarity and because those circumstances should have been raised.
261. See notes 109-18 & accompanying text supra.
262. The agreement between Blumcraft and the United States amounted to a consent
judgment, which is an agreement to settle a dispute and have judgment entered in a contemplated or pending action. See James, Consent Judgmentsas CollateralEstoppel, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 173, 175 (1959) (arguing consent judgments should not be given collateral estoppel
effect). See generally RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e, at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) (collateral

estoppel effect not given to issues not actually litigated, because parties may have lacked
opportunity or incentive to present best case, and to encourage compromise).
263. See note 77 supra. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(5), Comment
g, at 166 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) (collateral estoppel is inappropriate if circumstances
indicate prior judgment was based on compromise verdict or was otherwise ambivalent).
264. Thus, an examination limited to whether prior inconsistent judgments were arrived
at where the components of sound decision were present need not result in a "mere second
guess" as the district court in Kawneer had feared. See note 216 & accompanying text supra.
265. See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Blumcraft had full and fair opportunity to litigate in Blumcraft I); accord, Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Kan.), af§'d, 459 F.2d
482 (10th Cir. 1972).
266. See notes 171-74 & accompanying text supra.
267. See notes 52-60 & accompanying text supra.
268. "If the Supreme Court [in Blonder-Tongue] intended for estoppel to apply only
after the patent is held invalid the first time it is involved in litigation, then the road is clear
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The Courts' Ability to Apply Unilateral Collateral Estoppel
The question remaining about the applicability of unilateral collateral estoppel is whether the analysis advocated here would consume
so much time as to be impractical. In addressing this problem as it
relates to both patent litigation and more common civil litigation, one
relevant inquiry must focus on the multiple party's inadequate incentive to litigate in the prior action. Courts have been deciding this issue
for some time now, with respect to the common party, and exhibit no
particular inability to do so. 269 If a party asserting collateral estoppel

on the basis of one case seeks to draw distinctions on separate grounds
between that case and a number of other cases with inconsistent results,
the court may decide not to consider the separate distinctions for each
case. The standard should be administered on a case-by-case basis.
Only under such circumstances can a trial court decide whether the
difficulty of the inquiry is warranted by the benefits that collateral estoppel might confer.
Inquiring into differences between the legal theories asserted in
prior cases does not differ from questions which courts already decide.
The possibility of confusion of legal theories is something courts alcan
ready consider in deciding whether an absentee raising one theory
270
another.
raised
has
co-plaintiff
a
where
action
an
intervene in
Distinguishing between inconsistent judgments on the basis of the
evidence presented in them also is well within judicial competence.
The proposed test-whether the difference in evidence creates "a substantial possibility of a differing result" 27 1 -closely resembles the test
courts now use in deciding whether a new trial is warranted by newly
discovered evidence.272 The two standards admittedly are different.
The less exacting standard of "substantial possibility" would apply to
distinguish an earlier finding. The more exacting standard, whether the
new evidence is likely to change the result, 273 applies where the effect of
the new and different evidence is being considered in deciding whether
for the patentee-plaintiff, who was successful in his first suit, to bring infringement suits in
the future solely to shackle various defendants, often times small businessmen, with the
substantial legal fees incurred in patent suits." Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 341
F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
269. See notes 109-19 & accompanying text supra.
270. See notes 127-30 & accompanying text supra.
271. See note 95 & accompanying text supra.
272. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CML § 2808
(1973).
273. Eg., Kodekey Elec., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 458 (10th Cir. 1973); 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CML § 2808 (1973).
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to grant a new trial. The central point, however, is that the type of
274
inquiry is one in which courts have engaged for some time.
Conclusion
Collateral estoppel has long been considered an aid to judicial
economy and a means of preventing harassment of private parties
based on claims that they have litigated previously. One more function, its most crucial, has largely been overlooked: collateral estoppel is
of substantial utility in the ordering of extra-judicial relations.
Arguments against the offensive use of unilateral collateral estoppel are of two types. One is concerned with the sufficiency of a prior
decision as the basis for a unilateral use; the other goes to unfairness or
diseconomy in allowing offensive use. While the question whether the
party asserting unilateral collateral estoppel was a party to the prior
action has absolutely no bearing on whether that prior action is a sufficient basis for an estoppel, the sufficiency of the prior decision is a hurdle that nevertheless must be cleared for any application of collateral
estoppel.
A prior adjudication is sufficient for the application of collateral
estoppel if it is not manifestly unsound. Whenever an adjudication displays indicia of unsoundness, such as insufficient incentive for the common party to litigate fully in the prior adjudication, practical or
procedural impediments which denied the common party a full and
fair opportunity to litigate, or an error in the prior litigation which cannot fairly be charged to the common party, a court should not apply
collateral estoppel based on that litigation. Similarly, where there are
prior adjudications of the same issue involving the same party which
are truly inconsistent, rather than displaying merely superficially inconsistent results, then neither should be the basis for an application of
collateral estoppel.
The unilateral offensive use of collateral estoppel does not create a
problem of judicial diseconomy, or of unfairness, which would require
courts to adhere to mutuality in every case. There are a number of
reasons for an absentee to refrain from joining, which are also, from

the standpoint of judicial administration, reasons to limit joinder. A
rule which would apply unilateral collateral estoppel offensively unless
274.

The proposed inquiry into differences between prior inconsistent judgments would

also be similar to the inquiry now undertaken when a court examines the comity effect to be
given a prior decision on the same point in another circuit. See cases cited note 241 supra.
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the party asserting it had no practical, strategic, or legal reason not to
join strikes a fair balance between the competing objectives.
Unilateral offensive use only formalizes the practical effect of a
prior action on subsequent actions, hardly a practice which creates unfairness that did not already exist. Moreover, when one takes into account the "could easily have joined" standard in Parklane,the absentee
will not receive undue benefit. Rather, the absentee would receive a
benefit from an action in which he or she arguably should not be expected to join.
Courts are quite capable of administering the flexible rules which
correct application of collateral estoppel requires. In jurisdictions
which allow offensive unilateral collateral estoppel, flexible standards
such as the full-and-fair opportunity to litigate test are already being
applied. The State Farm and Kawneer courts, while shying away from
flexible standards, had at their command methods by which they could
have engaged in an analysis that was flexible, yet not so open-ended as
tQ frustrate judicial economy or to make the applicability of collateral
estoppel sufficiently uncertain to disturb extra-judicial relations. Nor
do the tests which this Article suggests require any analysis which is not
identical, or very similar, to that in which courts frequently engage.
In sum, the criticisms of the Bernharddoctrine and of offensive use
of unilateral collateral estoppel have resulted in unduly rigid analysis
by both supporters of and detractors from unilateral use. The flexible
approach championed by the Parklane Court can more fully serve the
ends of collateral estoppel while presenting no unjust disadvantage to
the parties estopped.

